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Shareholder Democracy and Special 
Interest Governance 
John H. Matheson† & Vilena Nicolet†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In the past several decades, the corporate governance1 land-
scape has changed dramatically and positively. In the 1960s, 
widely-dispersed individuals, with few resources and little in-
centive to monitor corporate management, still owned 80% of all 
corporate stock.2 Since that time, institutional investors’ share 
ownership has increased exponentially. Institutional ownership 
of publicly-traded corporations increased from 6.1% in 1950 to 
70% in 2016.3 This concentration of ownership brought with it 
the opportunity for shareholders to have a stronger voice both in 
corporate governance and on important social issues in our soci-
ety. 
Recently, shareholders have found new ways to directly im-
pact the governance regime and the board of directors. These 
 
†  Law Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, Corporate 
Institute, University of Minnesota Law School. Of Counsel, Kaplan, Strangis 
and Kaplan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. Copyright © 2019 by John H. 
Matheson.  
†† Associate, Kaplan, Strangis and Kaplan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
Copyright © 2019 by Vilena Nicolet.  
 1. As used here, corporate governance is the system and process by which 
power and decision-making is allocated among the corporation’s shareholders 
and other stakeholders, primarily the board of directors and corporate manage-
ment, but also including creditors, customers, suppliers, government, and soci-
ety as a whole. It consists of the laws, rules, practices, and processes by which 
a company is directed and controlled.  
 2. Andrew E. Nagel et al., The Williams Act: A Truly “Modern” Assess-
ment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 22, 2011), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Williams-Act 
-A-Truly-Modern-Assessment.pdf.  
 3. Paula Loop, Catherine Bromilow & Leah Malone, The Changing Face 
of Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., 
(Feb. 1 2018) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changing-face-of 
-shareholder-activism/#more-104497. 
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new means derive from various sources, including a more favor-
able regulatory environment and the influence of proxy advisory 
firms. The results have been amazing, including majority votes 
for director elections, declassification of corporate boards, share-
holder approval of executive pay, and proxy access for share-
holder nominees for board seats. Shareholder proposals on a 
multitude of social issues, from environmental concerns, such as 
climate change and sustainability, to board diversity and gender 
pay gap issues, have been vetted with some success. This move-
ment and increased role for shareholders suggests that some-
thing approaching shareholder democracy4 might actually be 
possible. Moreover, it shows that shareholder democracy is part 
of the broader democratic movement in our society. 
Unfortunately, the latest development in shareholder activ-
ity has gone counter to this trend. As happens in the political 
sphere, where power exists, preference is sought. The result in 
the corporate sphere is the rise of special interest corporate gov-
ernance. Activist investors are increasingly working outside the 
main governance mechanisms to advance private agendas.5 
They acquire an ownership stake in the company that is too 
small to command any change in the target company but then 
advocate for that change nevertheless. Among such advocacy 
tactics are threats to unseat the board, get rid of current man-
agement, or seek a sale or breakup of the target company.6 These 
activists threaten to take these demands directly to the other 
shareholders and to have these results occur through a proxy 
fight at the upcoming annual meeting of the company. The only 
alternative the activist offers to this, potentially very public, cor-
porate war is that the target company’s board agree to special 
concessions and benefits for the activist alone. 
Corporate boards may be intimidated by these tactics. The 
result is often that the target company board accedes, with the 
activist and the board cutting a private deal, whether termed a 
 
 4. Shareholder democracy refers to the ability of shareholders to dictate 
or influence the policy, governance, functions, and decisions of the corporation, 
either directly or through the board of directors and management, as a result of 
shareholders’ ownership rights. 
 5. Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist 
Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds 
-and-other-activist-investors (“There are more than 100 hedge funds currently 
engaged in frequent activism and over 300 others that have launched activism 
campaigns in recent years.”). 
 6. See Loop et al., supra note 3 (discussing the tactics that activists use). 
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settlement, standstill, or shareholder agreement, which may not 
advance the interests of the corporation or the larger share-
holder base, but only those of the activist and the board.7 These 
private deals often result in special benefits for the activist, pri-
marily in the form of their representatives being appointed to 
the board outside of the normal shareholder election process. 
Through this benefit, they access the inner sanctum—the board 
of directors. 
From the perspective of the boards, they receive a reprieve 
from the threat of a proxy fight or an attempt to force the sale of 
the company. The activist may make a variety of commitments, 
such as refraining from acquiring more shares, seeking govern-
ance or management changes except through the board, or run-
ning a proxy fight even after the activist’s term on the board ex-
pires. When these private deals with activist investors occur, the 
movement to shareholder democracy has been hijacked and spe-
cial interest governance triumphs. Because shareholder democ-
racy has become an integral and growing part of a broader dem-
ocratic process, undermining shareholder democracy results in 
undermining the democratic process in our society as a whole. 
The thesis of this Article is that the development of share-
holder democracy is good and that these special interest deals 
are not only bad for corporate governance and antithetical to the 
shareholder democracy movement, but also detrimental to the 
democratic values of our society. Recent activist activities thwart 
the traditional shareholder democracy movement and appropri-
 
 7. Jordan Schoenfeld, Shareholder-Manager Contracting in Public Com-
panies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/24/shareholder-manager-contracting 
-in-public-companies (reviewing over 4400 binding bilateral shareholder agree-
ments between 1996 and 2015). The numbers amassed by Schoenfeld also in-
clude situations that are not necessarily activist driven, such as joint venture 
agreements negotiated at arm’s length. Nevertheless, the number of private 
deals with activists is substantial and increasing. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon 
Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists (Columbia Bus. Sch.  
Research Paper No. 17-44; Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 906., 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2948869 (“While 
such settlements used to be rare, they now occur with significant frequency, and 
they have been attracting a great deal of media and practitioner attention.”); 
Jason Frankl & Steven Balet, The Rise of Settled Proxy Fights, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 22, 2017), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/the-rise-of-settled-proxy-fights/, (“[C]ompanies have 
more frequently succumbed to these investors and at times, accepted unfavora-
ble settlement terms instead of pushing forward and fighting through a proxy 
contest.”). 
  
1652 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1649 
 
ate special benefits to the activists and the narrow constituen-
cies they represent. Even more disappointingly, but not surpris-
ingly, corporate boards and management have become complicit 
in this process by facilitating these special interest deals. Limits 
must be placed on these special interest agreements. If regulated 
appropriately, shareholder democracy is on its way to becoming 
a strong political power that can counteract strong lobbies and 
corporate interests that are often not aligned with the societal 
values that many shareholders strive to advance. 
Part I describes the development of shareholder democracy, 
starting from shareholder primacy to managerial capitalism 
through the hostile takeover era and into insulated managerial-
ism. Part II then explores the recent resurgence of shareholder 
democracy, including monumental governance reforms and 
shareholder proxy access. The development of corporate democ-
racy is now at a stage where it is important to insert the share-
holder voice more directly in the governance process. This Part 
proposes creating shareholder advisory committees as an inte-
gral part of that process, either voluntarily by companies, or by 
way of regulatory mandate. Part III then explains the path taken 
by certain activist shareholders to avoid the regular corporate 
governance regime and instead lobby for individual or special in-
terest preferences, primarily in the form of seats on the board of 
directors. This Part demonstrates how the resulting special 
agreements violate basic governance principles to the detriment 
of the vast majority of the corporation’s other shareholders. Part 
IV proposes a means to simultaneously limit the special benefits 
of activist shareholders, and improve overall corporate democ-
racy. Shareholders as a whole should have the right to determine 
if it is in the best interests for an agreement with an activist to 
be binding on the corporation. This is the only path by which 
shareholder democracy can continue to ascend in the publicly 
held corporation. This Article embodies the solution in a pro-
posed model statute, which could be adopted by individual states 
or used as a template for shareholder proposals to change gov-
ernance documents in individual companies. 
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I.  THE WINDING PATH OF SHAREHOLDER 
INVOLVEMENT   
A. FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM 
The traditional shareholder primacy model8 of a corporation 
derives from the concept that the shareholders are the owners of 
the corporation and, as such, are entitled to control it, determine 
its policies, and decide whether to make fundamental shifts in 
its corporate policy and practice. This system of corporate gov-
ernance developed its essential attributes when “owners man-
aged and managers owned.”9 Share ownership was not widely 
dispersed, there were few institutional investors, and the found-
ers or local investors owned the shares of most corporations. 
That is, there was no divergence of interests between sharehold-
ers and management—the same people wore multiple hats. 
Other potential corporate constituencies took their place after 
the shareholders and only to the extent the shareholders deter-
mined, by contract or conscience, to be so bound. 
The shareholder vote has traditionally been seen as the fun-
damental mechanism for shareholder control over corporate de-
cisions.10 Most fundamentally, shareholders vote to elect and re-
move directors.11 In addition, fundamental corporate 
transactions require shareholder approval. For example, share-
holders normally must vote on mergers,12 dissolutions,13 or sales 
of substantially all of a corporation’s assets.14 Within this model, 
however, the board of directors—as a management organ—is 
presumed to act as a surrogate for, and in the interests of, the 
shareholders. 
The reign of the shareholder primacy mode of corporate gov-
ernance was short-lived. By the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, as the number of corporations grew and share ownership 
 
 8. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 1951, 1951 (2018) (“A foundational concept of corporate law and corpo-
rate governance is the principle of shareholder primacy.”). 
 9. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLU-
TION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 9–10 (1977). 
 10. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing 
Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (1990). 
 11. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2012). The board in turn des-
ignates officers to act as agents of the corporation. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 1 (1976). 
 12. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c). 
 13. See, e.g., id. § 275. 
 14. See, e.g., id. § 271. 
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dispersed,15 a division between owners and non-owner managers 
existed.16 As a result of the wide ownership dispersion, share-
holders’ ability to monitor corporate managers was significantly 
undermined17 and the power to control a corporation became 
concentrated in the hands of managers, who owned little stock, 
if any. 
Shareholder primacy fell on hard times. The separation of 
ownership and control gave rise to a period of managerial capi-
talism that was present for much of the twentieth century.18 A 
director-centric model of corporate governance became the norm; 
boards had broad authority to exercise their business judgment 
on most matters19 and shareholders seemingly had almost no in-
centive to become active investors.20 
This director or management primacy norm also enhanced 
the likelihood that those controlling the corporation would lack 
an incentive to maximize efficiency and shareholder profitability 
due to pressures to diverge from the interests of shareholders.21 
 
 15. The number of shareholders during the 1920s increased from several 
hundred thousand before World War I to around eight million at the end of the 
1920s. See HARVELL WELLS, SHAREHOLDER POWER IN AMERICA, 1800-2000: A 
SHORT HISTORY, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 1, 15 (Jen-
nifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). Also, the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933 prohibiting bank ownership of equity furthered corporate democratization 
and inhibited the development of institutional investors. See JANET DINE & 
MARIOS KOUTSIAS, THE NATURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 135 (2013). 
 16. WELLS, supra note 15, at 19. 
 17. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in 
the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 883 (1989) (“Each shareholder 
owned few shares and lacked the means or inclination to participate actively [in 
corporate matters].”). 
 18. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism, 58 
BUS. HIST. REV. 473 (1984) (discussing managerial capitalism). 
 19. ADAM O. EMMERICH ET AL., USA, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, JURIS-
DICTIONAL COMPARISONS 439 (1st ed. 2013).  
 20. LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHARE-
HOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 4 (2011). 
 21. Eighty years ago, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means identified the issue 
as endemic to the publicly-held corporation, that the “separation of ownership 
from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate 
manager may, and often do, diverge.” ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932). Indeed, 
over 200 years ago, Adam Smith phrased the problem in terms of handling other 
people’s money: “[t]he directors of such companies, however, being the manag-
ers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which . . . [they] watch over their own.” 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 741 (R.H. Campbell, A.S. 
Skinner & W.B. Todd eds., Clarendon Press 1976). The law and economics 
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This divergence allowed managers to pursue their own self-in-
terested agendas more aggressively within the corporate frame-
work. Historically, corporations dealt with these conflict issues 
by implementing directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and enforcing those duties by means of a shareholder 
derivative suit.22 
With relatively secure positions, corporate management 
grew their businesses either organically or through horizontal 
and vertical acquisitions. As companies grew and matured 
through the 1960s and 1970s, however, these traditional forms 
of corporate growth became less available.23 Expansion and di-
versification into unrelated lines of business then became the 
main drivers of merger and acquisition activity.24 This was the 
era of the friendly corporate takeover, with the managements of 
both participating companies eager to consolidate.25 Sharehold-
ers of both companies typically became shareholders of the com-
bined entity. An unprecedented period of corporate merger and 
acquisition activity followed.26 Corporate combinations of this 
type grew twelve-fold from 1960 through 1970.27 This resulted in 
corporate empire building and the age of the conglomerate,28 
which is described in the next Section.  
B. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND INSULATED MANAGERIALISM 
The conglomerates of the 1960s and 1970s did not perform 
as well as their managers had hoped.29 The ability to manage 
 
movement, originating in the 1970s, coined the term “agency costs” to identify 
the same concern. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers 
there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal.”). 
 22. See John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder Deriva-
tive Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 334–51 (2016).  
 23. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: 
Evidence and Implications, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 51, 51–52 
(1991). 
 24. Id. This wave of acquisition activity was also fueled by high corporate 
valuations, large cash flows, and active enforcement of antitrust laws chilling 
acquisition activity within the same industry or business sector. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, A Century of Corporate Takeo-
vers: What Have We Learned and Where Do We Stand?, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 
2148, 2153 fig. 1 (2008). 
 29. Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm 
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one form of business successfully does not necessarily carry over 
to managing disparate, unrelated businesses that comprise 
these conglomerates. Some companies voluntarily divested por-
tions of their conglomerate businesses, yet others did not.30 No 
matter the remedial steps that companies employed, when a 
company does not perform well, its shareholders are not happy. 
Shareholders typically have two primary means to express 
displeasure with the operation of the corporations that they own. 
The first is the right to vote, particularly in the election of the 
board of directors.31 As mentioned earlier, however, sharehold-
ers were widely dispersed at this time and did not effectively 
work together. The second means is the shareholders’ right to 
dispose of their investment by selling their shares. To this end, 
shareholders can vote with their feet instead of voting their 
shares—this is referred to as the Wall Street Walk.32 At the 
least, this conduct should evidence shareholder displeasure with 
management, which may constrain managerial abuses.33 
For example, a shareholder may sell shares to a corporate 
raider34 in a tender offer.35 Such a sale might result in a change 
in control and the ouster of management, that is, a hostile take-
over. Throughout the 1970s, and much of the 1980s, this market 
in corporate control acted as an important mechanism in moni-
 
in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. 
REV. 547, 554 (1994).  
 30. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 23, at 52–53. 
 31. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) 
(“If the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representa-
tives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board 
out.”). 
 32. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Share-
holder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2646 (2009). 
 33. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of 
a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 
1191, 1201 (1981). 
 34. Corporate raider is a pejorative term. As used here, corporate raider 
means a company or individual that follows a practice of making hostile takeo-
ver bids for companies, either to control their policies or to resell them for a 
profit. 
 35. See Joshua Kennon, Understanding Tender Offers the Affect on Inves-
tors, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-tender-offer 
-4129430 (last updated July 13, 2018) (“A tender offer is a public offer, made by 
a person, business, or group, who wants to acquire a given amount of a particu-
lar security.”). 
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toring corporate behavior and reversing much of the conglomer-
ation on the 1960s and 1970s.36 In these hostile takeovers, raid-
ers, or bidders, made above-market purchase offers directly to 
company shareholders, going over the heads of the target com-
pany’s management and board. Shareholders happily sold their 
shares for cash at a premium to the raider, or bidders, who pur-
chased a controlling interest, unseated corporate managements 
from their thrones, and toppled empires.37 
The hostile takeovers of the 1980s evidence the Wall Street 
Walk form of shareholder democracy.38 Up to that time, the frag-
mented status of share ownership allowed corporate manage-
ments to build conglomerate empires and perpetuate themselves 
in board and officer positions.39 Corporate raiders saw that these 
conglomerate companies could be more valuable if they were 
split up—the whole was less valuable than the sum of its parts. 
The results were startling. While the 1960s and 1970s were 
days of amalgamation, the resulting massive enterprises were 
acquired and broken up.40 In 1969, the height of the conglomer-
ation wave, the total value of transactions was $23.7 billion; in 
1981, during the hostile takeover and corporate break-up period, 
the value of transactions was almost four times greater, at $82.6 
billion.41 Over seventy percent of the assets acquired in hostile 
takeovers ended up, instead, in the hands of other companies in 
the same line of business as the assets acquired.42 
Meanwhile, corporate managements, fearful of losing their 
companies and their jobs, fought back. They implemented an ar-
senal of defensive measures designed to deter or prevent hostile 
 
 36. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legisla-
tive Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1425, 1435–38 (1991). 
 37. ROBERT SLATER, THE TITANS OF TAKEOVER 1–4 (1999). 
 38. See infra notes 184–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
whether shareholder activism resembles the hostile takeovers of the 1980s. 
 39. LESLIE A. WHITE, MODERN CAPITALIST CULTURE 388 (2008). 
 40. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the 1980s, 
249 SCI. 745, 746 (1990) (“In the 1980s takeover wave, the so-called ‘corporate 
raiders’ and many leveraged buyout (LBO) specialists played the critical role of 
brokers. They acquired conglomerates, busted them up, and sold off most busi-
ness segments to large corporations in the same businesses.”). 
 41. SLATER, supra note 37, at 5. In 1984, the figure grew to $122 billion and 
in 1985 the number was $200 billion. Some of this activity was fueled by less-
ening of antitrust restrictions and enforcement in the Reagan administration. 
Id. at 5–7. 
 42. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 23, at 54. 
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takeovers, ranging from golden parachutes, to stock repur-
chases, to poison pills.43 Also in this era, the most famous cases 
of corporate law were decided.44 In 1985 and 1986, the Delaware 
Supreme court decidedly took the corporate management’s side 
in the hostile takeover battle. The Court approved company 
boards adopting defensive measures to fend off hostile takeo-
vers,45 specifically validated target companies adopting poison 
pills,46 and allowed companies to keep defensive measures in 
place unless, and until, the board of directors of the company had 
made a decision to sell the company.47 
At the same time, state legislatures, pressured by local com-
panies and afraid that acquired businesses would be broken up 
or moved to other states, passed a panoply of antitakeover stat-
utes. These included business combination acts, control share ac-
quisition acts, and multi-constituency provisions.48 Additionally, 
these legislatures adopted director exculpation statutes, which 
immunized corporate directors from breach of fiduciary duty 
claims based on the duty of care.49 
The result of these combined corporate, judicial, and legis-
lative measures created an impasse on the hostile takeover 
front. Managers became relatively protected from the direct 
threat of a hostile takeover and a period of insulated manageri-
alism set in.50 As detailed in the next Part, this stage of develop-
ment did not last long. 
 
 43. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm 
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1347–50 
(1992).  
 44. The most famous corporate law case is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858 (Del. 1985), where the Court identified the standard that a board of direc-
tors must follow for its decision for the company to be acquired to have the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule.  
 45. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985). 
 46. Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d. 1346 (Del. 1985).  
 47. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
 48. Matheson & Olson, supra note 43, at 1338–46. 
 49. Id. at 1346–47. 
 50. Id. at 1337–53 (discussing insulated managerialism); see also Unitrin, 
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995) (“[T]he emergence of the 
‘poison pill’ as an effective takeover device has resulted in such a remarkable 
transformation in the market for corporate control . . . .”). 
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II.  THE MODERN RESURGANCE OF SHAREHOLDER 
DEMOCRACY   
Several trends coalesced in the 1990s, leading to a new wave 
of real shareholder democracy, one in which shareholders voiced 
their preferences by voting their shares instead of by selling 
them. The first was the stock ownership consolidation in the 
hands of institutional investors, giving them both the financial 
credibility and the incentive to play a more active role in corpo-
rate governance.51 
The second trend was the ascendancy of proxy advisory 
firms. Proxy advisory firms provide research and recommenda-
tions as to how institutional investors should vote their shares 
in publicly held companies.52 Traditionally, institutional inves-
tors generally had not taken an active role in corporate govern-
ance53 and proxy advisory firms filled the void: 
  [Proxy advisory firms’] rise to prominence began in the early 1980s 
in the wake of a U.S. Department of Labor’s interpretation of the Em-
ployees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which seemed to re-
quire a prudent trustee to vote the shares it held in portfolio compa-
nies. Failing to vote shares in its view implied wasting a portfolio asset 
and signaled that the fiduciary was breaching its duty of care. . . . 
  Because many mutual funds compete by attempting to minimize 
overhead costs and thus have only small in-house staffs, these funds 
found it easier to outsource the voting decision to a third party. Proxy 
advisors—most notably ISS and Glass Lewis—developed to fill this 
role.54 
 
 51. By 1990 institutional investors owned a majority of the stock of all pub-
licly traded companies in 1990, up from just twenty-three percent in 1955. MI-
CHAEL J. RUBACH, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: THE CHANGING 
FACE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 8–9 (1999). Today that percentage is seventy 
percent. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Luis A. Aguilar, SEC, 
Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility, SEC (Apr. 19, 2013), https:// 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch041913laahtm (“Simply stated, institu-
tional investors are dominant market players . . . .”). 
 52. See TIMOTHY M. DOYLE, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION, CON-
FLICTED ROLE OF PROXY ADVISORS 1 (May 2018), http://cdn.accf.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/05/ACCF-The-Conflicted-Role-of-Proxy-Advisor-FINAL.pdf (de-
scribing the role of proxy advisory firms). 
 53. That tradition is changing to some extent. See Abe M. Friedman, 
BlackRock’s Call for Companies to Deliver Financial & Social Value, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2018/02/06/blackrocks-call-for-companies-to-deliver-financial 
-social-value. 
 54. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of 
Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 557–58 
(2016). Proxy advisory firms, however, have their own potential conflict of in-
terest issues. See DOYLE, supra note 52. 
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The third trend was the revitalized utilization of Securities 
and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-8, titled “shareholder pro-
posals” (the Rule).55 The Rule has been called “the epicenter of 
the shareholder rights movement,”56 and “a platform for commu-
nication and change.”57 The Rule allows shareholders to submit 
precatory proposals on the company proxy statement without in-
curring the expense of sending their own proxy statement.58 It is 
a great means of communication for shareholders of public com-
panies because the proxy statement reaches all of the sharehold-
ers whether or not the shareholder attends an annual meeting 
and votes on the matters in person. In fact, the majority of share-
holders of large public companies do not attend the annual meet-
ing and instead vote by proxy.59 Therefore, shareholder pro-
posals submitted pursuant to the Rule provide an efficient way 
to submit one’s proposal for a vote to all shareholders of the com-
pany during the annual shareholder meeting.60  
With such drastic changes in the ownership structure, guid-
ance from proxy advisory firms, and access to companies’ proxy 
statements, the role of shareholders in the corporate structure 
has changed as well. Shareholders, beginning as passive observ-
ers, have turned into active participants who shape the corporate 
governance and democracy in many positive ways. The following 
Sections illustrate several examples of this shareholder activ-
ism, influencing board structure, voting requirements, compen-
sation, social policy disclosures, and proxy access. 
A. NOTABLE SHAREHOLDER SUCCESSES 
1. The Decline of Classified Boards 
Classified boards provide that only a portion of a board’s 
 
 55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998). 
 56. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Evolving Role of Rule 14A-8 in the Corporate 
Governance Process, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 151 (2016).  
 57. FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 63. Of course, not all think that the share-
holder proposal rule is a good thing. Some view it as an expensive process em-
ployed by a relatively few idiosyncratic shareholders. See David A. Katz & 
Laura A. McIntosh, Shareholder Proposals in an Era of Reform, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2017/12/05/shareholder-proposals-in-an-era-of-reform. 
 58. FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 64.  
 59. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 244, 330 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 7th ed. 1997) 
(“Proxy voting is the dominant mode of shareholder decision making in publicly 
held corporations.”). 
 60. Id. 
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members will be up for election in any given year. Typically, one-
third of the directors are elected each year, and each director 
serves a three-year term. As with the staggered terms for elected 
officials in the U.S. Senate, this structure allows for continuity 
since only one third of the directors are replaced in any given 
year. 
Although scholars have debated whether classified boards 
are good61 or bad,62 shareholders view classified boards as an en-
trenchment device that makes it difficult to replace the entire 
board in a single year.63 Shareholders have been submitting pro-
posals to declassify boards since the 1980s.64 In 2000, such pro-
posals started gaining more than fifty percent shareholder sup-
port, a passing vote.65 Since then, proposals to declassify 
corporate boards have been presented more than 800 times at 
more than 500 companies.66 
What has been the result? While most S&P 500 companies 
had classified boards in 2000, 89.1% of S&P 500 companies had 
 
 61. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder 
Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 67 (2016) (arguing that stag-
gered boards are associated with an increased firm value); Guhan Subrama-
nian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (HARV. JOHN M. OLIN DISCUS-
SION PAPER SERIES NO. 828) (2015) (arguing that de-staggering of boards of 
directors was a mistake, which resulted in short-termism in corporate board-
rooms); Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Pro-
ject Is Wrong, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 23, 
2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23/harvards-shareholder-rights 
-project-is-wrong (arguing that a staggered board is an important tool in fending 
off inadequate bids that harm companies focusing on long-term value creation 
and that, to the contrary, the idea that declassifying boards will help long-term 
value creation is not supported by any evidence and thus must be rejected).  
 62. See, e.g., Lucia A. Bebchuck, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves 
Long-term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2013) (finding no supporting 
evidence that boards insulation at current (or higher) levels serves long-term 
interests of a company and its shareholders); Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Stag-
gered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 
110 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2013) (finding that staggered boards bring about reduced 
shareholder value).  
 63. FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 80. 
 64. The Latest in Governance Reform – Proxy Access, INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS), https://www.issgovernance.com/the-latest-in 
-governance-reform-proxy-access (“[T]he campaign’s early years (in the late-
1980s and 1990s) moved in slow motion as staggered board repeals – largely 
prodded by gadflies’ shareholder proposals during this period . . . .”). 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. (“Voting Analytics data show that investors have cast their votes on 
811 repeal classified board shareholder proposals at 511 unique firms since the 
year 2000. Average support over this period is 66.7 percent of the votes cast. 
Nearly 70 percent of these proposals received majority votes; 62 percent are 
considered to have passed.”). 
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declassified boards in 2015.67 Whether one believes that stag-
gered boards are good or bad for corporate governance, the mes-
sage is clear. Shareholders are exercising a clearer and stronger 
voice in the companies they own. Management is listening. 
Shareholder democracy exists, at least in this arena. 
2. Majority Voting Movement 
Electing the board of directors is maybe the most fundamen-
tal shareholder right. Historically, directors were elected by a 
plurality vote—that is, the candidate with the most votes wins, 
even if that vote is not a majority of the votes that are cast.68 
Under this method, although shareholders could withhold their 
vote for a director, they could not vote against that director.69 
Thus, in an uncontested election, every nominee elected by a plu-
rality wins his or her seat upon receiving just one “for” vote.70 
Shareholders, however, have balked at that standard,71 par-
ticularly in uncontested elections.72 Shareholders made pro-
posals that would require companies to adopt majority voting, 
thereby requiring uncontested board nominees to receive more 
 
 67. Fewer Classified Boards Could Mean Higher Director Turnover, EQUI-
LAR BLOG (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.equilar.com/blogs/84-fewer-classified 
-boards.html. (“About 58.5% of Russell 3000 companies had a declassified board 
in 2015, up from 52.5% in 2011.”). 
 68. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2018) (“Directors shall be 
elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented 
by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors . . . .”). 
 69. Plurality voting allows for election of a nominee who receives the most 
“for” votes until all board seats are filled. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, 
FAQ: MAJORITY VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 1–2 [hereinafter MAJORITY VOTING RE-
PORT], https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/board_accountability/ 
majority_voting_directors/CII%20Majority%20Voting%20FAQ%201-4-17.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2019). Almost all companies give shareholders an option 
on the ballot to “withhold” their vote. Id. However, such withheld votes do not 
have any effect. Id.  
 70. Moreover, a director can be elected with a single “for” vote over the op-
position of all other voting shares. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corpo-
rate Governance: Majority Election of Directors,  
N.Y. L.J. (2005). The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) calls it a “rubber 
stamp” process to entrench boards and to elect directors who lack support of 
shareholders representing a majority. MAJORITY VOTING REPORT, supra, at 2.  
 71. Beginning in 2005, shareholders started to insist on changes in the vot-
ing standard. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board 
Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1119, 1125 (2016) (detailing a study 
covering around 65,000 of uncontested elections between 2007 and 2013). 
 72. Randall S. Thomas & Patrick C. Tricker, Shareholder Voting in Proxy 
Contests for Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections and Management 
Proposals: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 9, 49 (2017) 
(“The overwhelming majority of corporate elections are uncontested.”).  
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“for” votes than “against” votes in order to be elected or re-
elected.73 The shift from plurality to majority voting has been 
recognized as one of the “most popular and successful govern-
ance reforms.”74 In 2004, shareholders submitted only twelve 
proposals to adopt majority voting.75 In 2005, the number of pro-
posals increased to eighty-nine and this became the most com-
mon form of proposal.76 In 2006, more than 150 majority vote 
proposals were submitted.77 
These proposals were effective. In 2005, only nine of all S&P 
100 companies used majority voting in director elections.78 How-
ever, by 2017, ninety percent of S&P 500 companies had adopted 
some type of majority voting.79 Companies that moved away 
from plurality voting generally adopted one of three types of di-
rector election regimes: (1) “plurality plus;”80 (2) majority voting 
with board-rejectable resignation;81 (3) and consequential major-
ity voting.82 Whatever the format adopted, shareholders once 
again demonstrated that they are able to ensure they would be 
heard. 
 
 73. Majority Voting for Directors, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV., http:// 
www.cii.org/majority_voting_directors (last visited Jan. 29, 2019). 
 74. Choi et al., supra note 71, at 1119. 
 75. FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 89.  
 76. Id. at 88–89. 
 77. Id. at 89. 
 78. Choi et al., supra note 71, at 1121.  
 79. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV., supra note 73. 
 80. In response to a growing investor dissatisfaction with the plurality vot-
ing, since 2004 some companies have adopted plurality plus voting regime. MA-
JORITY VOTING REPORT, supra note 69, at 2. Under this approach, a majority-
opposed director must tender a resignation to the board. Id. However, a director 
who does not receive majority support is still elected for another term, subject 
to the board’s acceptance of his or her resignation. Id. CII recognizes this ap-
proach to be in the right direction but admits that it is not the best approach to 
elect uncontested directors. Id. 
 81. Under the majority voting with board-rejectable resignation approach, 
uncontested nominees must receive more “for” votes than “against” votes to be 
elected. Id. Majority opposed nominees will not be elected under this approach. 
Id. However, the majority of companies couple the standard with a resignation 
requirement for defeated directors. Id. Under that requirement, the board re-
tains the authority over whether the defeated director departs or stays. Id. 
Thus, it is an imperfect voting regime that preserves the board’s power over the 
board’s composition. Id. 
 82. Pursuant to the consequential majority voting approach, an uncon-
tested nominee must receive more “for” votes than “against” to be elected. Id. 
Additionally, there is a reasonable point at which an unelected director may no 
longer serve on the board. Id. 
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The powerful shareholder movement toward a majority vot-
ing regime fostered legislative and regulatory changes. Prior to 
2006, nearly every state corporate code provided for plurality 
voting as the default rule for director elections.83 Subsequently, 
a number of states amended their corporate code to provide for 
majority voting as the default rule.84 In 2006, Delaware 
amended its corporate code prohibiting boards of directors from 
repealing shareholder-adopted bylaws providing for majority 
voting for the election of directors.85 In 2009, the SEC effectively 
amended NYSE Rule 452, curtailing brokers’ ability to vote with-
out instruction from shareholders in uncontested elections by ex-
cluding such elections from its “routine” matters definition.86 
This means that the shareholders themselves would have to 
vote. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act strengthened that change by 
applying it to all national exchanges as well as advisory votes on 
compensation and other matters the SEC considers significant.87 
Thus, a series of shareholder-driven developments resulted in a 
wholesale change in the shareholder voting process. 
3. Say on Pay 
Say-on-pay rules allow shareholders to weigh in on the com-
pensation of the highest-ranking corporate executives in their 
company. These rules originated in the shareholder proposal 
proxy process.88 In 1992, the SEC expanded the topics suitable 
for shareholder proposals to include shareholder proposals on ex-
ecutive compensation.89 These new 1992 rules were intended to 
 
 83. Robert Profusek et al., Majority Voting for Directors, JONES DAY (Oct. 
31, 2006), https://www.jonesday.com/Majority-Voting-for-Directors-10-31-2006 
(“Plurality voting in the election of directors is the default standard in most 
state corporate statutes, including Delaware’s, as well as under the Model 
Act.”). 
 84. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELEC-
TIONS v–vi (2007), https://www.kattenlaw.com/Files/45102_FINAL%20% 
20MAJORITY%20VOTE%20SURVEY.pdf.  
 85. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2018) (“A bylaw amendment 
adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the 
election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of 
directors.”). 
 86. Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215 (July 1, 2009).  
 87. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2012). 
 88. Stephani A. Mason et al., Say-on-Pay: Is Anybody Listening? 20 MULTI-
NATIONAL FIN. J. 273, 285 (2016). 
 89. Id. Stock options were increasingly used to incentivize CEOs’ perfor-
mance. As a result, CEO pay significantly increased. Fabrizio Ferri, Say on Pay, 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 319, 320 (Jennifer G. Hill & 
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shed more light on and to address growing concerns about exec-
utive compensation and performance.90 
Starting in 2004, executive compensation became a domi-
nant topic for shareholder proposals.91 In 2009, shareholders 
submitted more than 200 pay-related proposals.92 By 2010, the 
say-on-pay shareholder proposals calling for an advisory vote on 
executive compensation were the center of attention and the 
dominant type of shareholder proposal that was submitted.93 
As a result of this strong support for the say-on-pay pro-
posals and the financial crisis of 2007–2008,94 the federal gov-
ernment decided to mandate say-on-pay rules.95 In 2009, compa-
nies receiving funding under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
were mandated to hold an annual shareholder say-on-pay vote.96 
Further, the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, and the SEC rules imple-
menting the Dodd-Frank Act in 2011, mandated that public com-
panies provide shareholders with an advisory say-on-pay vote at 
least every three years,97 a non-binding vote on the frequency of 
a say-on-pay vote,98 and an advisory vote on compensation ar-
 
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
 90. Marilyn F. Johnson et al., An Empirical Analysis of the SEC’s 1992 
Proxy Reforms on Executive Compensation 1, 4–5 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. 
of Bus., Research Paper No. 1679, 2001). The new SEC rules required expanded 
proxy statement disclosures and allowed shareholder proposals on executive 
compensation. Id. The intent was to create a mechanism for shareholders to 
express their dissatisfaction with the compensation policies disclosed in the 
proxy statement. Id. 
 91. FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 78. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Ferri, supra note 89, at 321. 
 95. FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 79. 
 96. Id. Around 400 companies were required to hold say-on-pay votes. Id. 
 97. Id. The SEC rules required that companies provide disclosure in the 
annual meeting proxy statement, including whether the vote is binding. SEC 
Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute as Required under Dodd-
Frank Act, SEC (Jan. 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25 
.htm [hereinafter Say-on-Pay Release]. Also, an additional disclosure is required 
in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) regarding whether and 
how companies have considered the results of the most recent say-on-pay vote. 
Id. 
 98. FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 79. The frequency vote is required at least 
once every six years. Say-on-Pay Release, supra note 97. The companies must 
disclose the frequency in the annual meeting proxy statement. Id. To provide 
shareholders with the information on how frequent they may vote on executive 
compensation, the SEC mandated that a company file From 8-K no later than 
150 calendar days after the date of the annual meeting in which the vote took 
place, and no later than 60 calendar days before the deadline for submission of 
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rangements in connection with mergers (i.e. “golden para-
chutes”).99 For the first time shareholders of a company could 
directly validate or criticize the executive compensation arrange-
ments that the company’s board provided to top-level manage-
ment. A stronger validation of the power of pure shareholder de-
mocracy, with the ability to move both corporations and 
legislatures, is hard to find.100 
4. Environmental and Social Proposals 
Shareholders have presented environmental and social pro-
posals with increasing frequency. For the past few years, pro-
posals calling for companies to disclose their political participa-
tion and political contributions have most frequently been 
brought to a vote.101 Climate change proposals asking companies 
to disclose their business risks related to climate change are at 
historically high levels.102 Shareholders have asked companies 
to introduce policies to enhance board and employee diversity.103 
 
Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals for the subsequent meeting. Id. The form 
must disclose the company’s decision regarding the frequency of the say-on-pay 
vote. Id. 
 99. The “golden parachute” disclosure is also required in connection with a 
number of transactions, including going-private transactions and third-party 
tender offers to ensure the availability of the information for shareholders with-
out regard to the structure of the transaction. Id. In August of 2015, the SEC 
adopted final rules implementing the pay ratio disclosure mandate of Section 
953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Under the final rule, companies must disclose 
“the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the [com-
pany] . . . other than the CEO . . . the annual total compensation of the 
CEO . . . and the ratio of these two amounts.” Ronald O. Mueller et al., SEC 
Issues Significant Guidance on Pay Ratio Rules, 31 INSIGHTS CORP. & SEC. L. 
ADVISER 3 (2017). The disclosure will be required in the company’s 2018 proxy 
statement. Id. 
 100. See also Aguilar, supra note 51 (“‘[S]ay-on-pay’ is an opportunity for 
shareholder engagement — providing investors with a forum to discuss com-
pensation and other corporate governance issues with management, and en-
hancing the ability of institutional investors, in particular, to have their voices 
heard.”). 
 101. Thomas Singer, Environmental and Social Proposals in the 2017 Proxy 
Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/26/environmental-and-social 
-proposals-in-the-2017-proxy-season. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. “Board diversity—in particular, the inclusion of women on boards—
received significant attention in 2017, including through institutional investor 
policies, shareholder proposals, company proxy disclosure and non-binding 
state legislative resolutions. This is likely to be a topic of continued focus in 
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Since 2015 (when the first gender pay gap proposal was intro-
duced), gender pay gap proposals have become another of the 
most frequently voted environmental and social topics during 
the proxy season.104 
Through their pursuit of environmental and social pro-
posals, shareholders have wielded significant influence on U.S. 
companies’ environmental and social behavior.105 A study ana-
lyzing around 2,665 shareholder proposals submitted between 
1997 and 2012 discovered that when shareholders file a proposal 
on an environmental, social, or governance issue, the company’s 
performance with respect to that issue improves.106 When faced 
with such proposals, managers invest more resources to address 
these issues including diversity, energy efficiency, water con-
sumption, and product safety.107 Today, this trend continues.108 
Shareholders are actively submitting proposals and setting a 
high social conscience standard for corporations.109 
 
 104. Singer, supra note 101. Additionally, proposals on Holy Land Principles 
(calling for American companies conducting business in Palestine-Israel to prac-
tice fair employment) have been increasingly introduced by shareholders this 
proxy season. Id. Finally, proposals calling companies to publish sustainability 
reports continue to gain traction. Id. 
 105. Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 218 
(2018); see FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 82 (noting that the “success” of share-
holder proposals depends on their ability to prompt corporations to dialogue ra-
ther than to garner majority support); see also YAFIT COHN, SIMPSON THACHER, 
CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABILITY AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSALS 2 
(2016), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/firmmemo_08_08_ 
16_environmental-proposals.pdf. (“[Environmental proposals] appear to be get-
ting more traction, as companies seem to be more inclined to negotiate with 
proponents as compared to previous years.”). 
 106. George Serafeim, The Fastest-Growing Cause for Shareholders Is Sus-
tainability, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 12, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/the-fastest 
-growing-cause-for-shareholders-is-sustainability. 
 107. Id. 
 108. During the 2006–2014 proxy period, Proxy Monitor reported thirty-nine 
percent of proposals relating to process-based corporate-governance concerns—
such as board structure and the rules for electing directors and taking other 
shareholder actions; thirty-nine percent of proposals were on social policies; and 
twenty-two percent of proposals involved executive compensation. James R. 
Copland, Recent Legal and Regulatory Changes Create Uncertain Landscape for 
2015 Proxy Season: Proxy Access on the Agenda, PROXY MONITOR, http:// 
www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/pmr_10.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2019). During 
2017 proxy season, thirty-six percent of proposals were on corporate govern-
ance, fifty-six percent—on social policy, and eight percent—on executive com-
pensation. James R. Copland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2017: Sea-
son Review, PROXY MONITOR, http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/pmr_15.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2019).  
 109. Christopher P. Skroupa, 2017 and Beyond—Major Trends Shaping 
Shareholder Activism, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
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5. Proxy Access 
Shareholders have the legal right to elect directors.110 How-
ever, each publicly held company has a nominating committee 
solely made up of board members that recommends a slate of 
director candidates to the shareholders.111 The company then re-
leases a proxy statement recommending only those candidates 
that the board itself nominates for election to the board.112 Indi-
vidual shareholders generally have neither the inclination nor 
the means to wage a proxy contest, in which it would propose a 
competing slate of directors for election. As a practical matter, in 
the absence of a hostile proxy fight, the shareholders automati-
cally elect the directors so nominated.113 Therefore, the boards of 
directors of publicly held corporations are self-perpetuating.114 
Consequently, “proxy access” has been deemed a significant 
achievement of shareholder democracy.115 In its purest form, 
proxy access allows shareholders to place their own nominees on 
 
christopherskroupa/2017/10/31/2017-and-beyond-major-trends-shaping 
-shareholder-activism/#668d4c8e15e7. Institutional shareholders “have de-
ployed $45 billion in new campaigns year to date, nearly double the amount for 
all of 2016.” Id. The “big three” (Vanguard, State Street and BlackRock) set a 
strategy that indicates their concern for the environmental, social, and govern-
ance (ESG) practices of their portfolio companies. Id.  
 110. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2018) (“Directors shall be 
elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented 
by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors”. . . .”). 
 111. See, e.g., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 303A.04 (N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE 
2013); LISTING RULE 5605(e) (NASDAQ 2006). 
 112. MAJORITY VOTING REPORT, supra note 69, at 2 (“It’s a ‘rubber stamp’ 
process that entrenches boards and, in rare instances, elects directors who lack 
the confidence of shareholders representing a majority.”). 
 113. Robert C. Pozen, Shareholders Get a Louder Voice, BROOKINGS (Mar. 3, 
2015), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/shareholders-get-a-louder-voice (ar-
guing that although shareholders may nominate directors, the cost is so high 
for public companies that it effectively prevents most shareholders from making 
nominations).  
 114. Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process for Corporate Boards of 
Directors: A Decision-Making Analysis, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 132 (2008) 
(“The nominating procedure for electing directors to the corporate board has 
turned the formal legal structure of corporate governance on its head. The 
shareholders may be equity owners of the corporation, but when they are pre-
sented with an unopposed slate of directorial candidates, without having prac-
tical means of nominating their own candidates, it is clear that management 
effectively controls the corporate ballot.”). 
 115. See Karey Wutkowski, SEC to Look Outside Ballot on Proxy Access, 
REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-lifting/sec 
-to-look-outside-ballot-on-proxy-access-idUSN1741224720080104 (noting that 
proxy access has been considered a “holy grail” of shareholder democracy). 
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the company’s proxy ballot, with information about those nomi-
nees included in the company’s proxy statement.116 This avoids 
the cost required for the shareholder to produce a separate set of 
proxy materials.117 These shareholder nominees for board posi-
tions would appear as alternatives to the slate of directors posed 
by the board itself.118 
Proxy access went through several stages of development 
before it reached its current form. The SEC staff first proposed 
a pure form of proxy access in 1942.119 This form would have pro-
vided that “minority stockholders be given an opportunity to use 
the management’s proxy material in support of their own nomi-
nees for directorships[,]” and required that “stockholders be per-
mitted to use the management’s proxy statement to canvass 
stockholders generally for the election of their own nominees for 
directorships, as well as for the nominees of the management.”120 
A shareholder was not required to hold a certain amount of stock 
or to have held stock for any certain period of time. The proposal 
was not adopted,121 and the SEC’s attempts to revisit the issue 
in 1982, 2003, and 2007 also resulted in no action.122 
The SEC made its most recent attempt to tackle the proxy 
access issue in 2010. The SEC adopted a new Rule 14a-11, man-
dating proxy access for all public corporations, and allowing cer-
tain shareholders to nominate up to three persons for election to 
a corporation’s board.123 Under the Rule 14a-11, “a nominating 
shareholder or group will be required to satisfy an ownership 
 
 116. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 
1259, 1260 (2009).  
 117. Id. at 1267–68. 
 118. Proxy Access, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV.  https://www.cii.org/proxy_ 
access [hereinafter Proxy Access].  
 119. FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 65. 
 120. DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY PRO-
CESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 2 (2003),  
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf. 
 121. Id. “The Commission did not provide an explanation for its determina-
tion, stating simply that, ‘a number of the suggestions proposed by the staff 
were not adopted,’ including the suggestion related to shareholder access to the 
company’s proxy material.” Id. (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347 (Dec. 
18, 1942)). 
 122. See FAIRFAX, supra note 20, at 132–34. 
 123. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 33-9136, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,773–93 (Sept. 16, 2010) (adopting 
changes to the federal proxy rules to permit direct shareholder nomination of 
directors). 
  
1670 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1649 
 
threshold of at least 3% of the voting power of the company’s se-
curities” and “will be required to have held the qualifying 
amount of securities continuously for at least three years.”124 
The new rule caused a lengthy debate over whether and to 
what extent shareholders should have access to companies’ 
proxy statements.125 However, the debate was short-lived. In 
July 2011, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated 
Rule 14a-11.126 The court reasoned that the SEC was “arbitrary 
and capricious” in adopting the rule and violated the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act by failing to conduct an adequate cost/ben-
efit analysis in adopting Rule 14a-11.127 
Although the attempt to create a federal rule of proxy access 
applicable to all publicly held corporations failed, real share-
holder democracy began to kick in. Institutional investors and 
proxy advisors began to pressure corporations into changing 
their bylaws to permit proxy access, allowing shareholders to 
nominate a minority slate of directors for possible election at the 
annual shareholder meeting by means of the corporation’s proxy 
statement and proxy card.128 Generally, these proposals pro-
vided proxy access to shareholders who held at least three per-
cent of outstanding shares for at least three years.129 This move-
ment became known as proxy access by private ordering.130 The 
SEC supported this movement by adopting changes to Rule 14a-
8(i)(8),131 which previously allowed a company to exclude pro-
posals that related to nomination or election of directors, or pro-
cedures for such nominations or elections, from the proxy mate-
rials.132 As amended, Rule 14a-8(i)(8) does not allow companies 
 
 124. Id. at 23–24. 
 125. The Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 12-6th Corp. Practice Portfolio 
Series (BNA) ch. 4, § E 2 (2018). 
 126. See Bus. Roundtable Inc. v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 127. Id. at 1154. The SEC decided not to seek a rehearing or appeal of the 
decision. 
 128. Proxy Access, supra note 118. Proxy access also allows a nominating 
shareholder to provide a brief description of his or her nominee in the company’s 
proxy statement. Id. 
 129. Id.; see also COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, PROXY ACCESS: BEST 
PRACTICES 2017, at 4 (2017), http://www.cii.org/files/publicaitons/misc/Proxy_ 
Access_2017_Final.pdf (describing best practices in proxy access). Not all of the 
three percent had to be owned by one shareholder. Shareholders could pool their 
shares to meet the ownership requirement and nominate candidates. Id. 
 130. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, PROXY ACCESS BY PRIVATE ORDER-
ING 2 (2017) [hereinafter PRIVATE ORDERING], http://www.cii.org/files/ 
publications/misc/02_02_17_proxy_access_private_ordering_final.pdf. 
 131. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2018). 
 132. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,100 
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to exclude shareholder proposals to amend, or request that the 
companies consider amending, governing documents to provide 
for procedures for shareholder director nominations.133 
Initially, companies were slow to amend their bylaws to per-
mit proxy access.134 However, in November 2014, the Comptrol-
ler of the City of New York, acting on behalf of the New York 
City pension funds, instituted a campaign for the 2015 proxy 
season, submitting seventy-five proxy access proposals to differ-
ent companies.135 This initiative—the Boardroom Accountability 
Project—greatly accelerated the public companies’ adoption of 
proxy access.136 In 2014, only fifteen shareholder proxy access 
proposals went to a vote, and only four passed.137 In both 2015 
and 2016, more than eighty such proposals went to a vote, and 
shareholders approved more than half.138 
Faced with this evidence of substantial shareholder support, 
many companies “voluntarily” adopted this form of proxy access. 
As of January 2018, sixty-five percent of S&P 500 companies 
have adopted proxy access.139 This success, together with the 
other shareholder initiatives discussed in this Section, show sig-
nificant instances of shareholders’ impact on publicly held com-
panies. The next step, addressed in Part I.B, is to institutionalize 
the shareholders’ role in the ongoing governance process. 
B. IMPROVING SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: SHAREHOLDER 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES 
  The time has come for a new model of shareholder engagement—
one that strengthens and deepens communication between sharehold-
ers and the companies that they own. If engagement is to be meaning-
ful and productive—if we collectively are going to focus on benefitting 
 
(Sept. 20, 2011). 
 133. SCOTT LESMES, MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS ABOUT SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND PROXY ACCESS 16 (2017), 
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/frequently-asked-questions-about 
-shareholder-proposals-and-proxy-access.pdf. The proposal could not conflict 
with Rule 14a-11 and could not otherwise be excludable under some other pro-
cedural or substantive grounds. Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. PRIVATE ORDERING, supra note 130, at 2; Boardroom Accountability 
Project, N. Y. C. COMPTROLLER, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/financial 
-matters/boardroom-accountability-project/overview (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). 
 136. N. Y. C. COMPTROLLER, supra note 135. 
 137. PRIVATE ORDERING, supra note 130, at 2. 
 138. Id. 
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shareholders instead of wasting time and money in proxy fights—then 
engagement needs to be a year-round conversation about improving 
long-term value.”140 
The key to the continued growth of shareholder democracy, 
as a corporate governance mechanism and as a subspecies of the 
democratic process as a whole, is to provide the means by which 
shareholders may be heard, and their voices may be given the 
maximum effect.141 Shareholders, on the one hand, and the 
board and management, on the other, are in a corporate govern-
ance relationship. Effective communication is key to any healthy 
relationship. By the nature of their role in directing company 
policy and operations, management and the board have ongoing 
input.142 The shareholders, however, do not.143 Thus, a publicly 
held corporation must find ways to enhance shareholder engage-
ment in order to provide the information that both shareholders 
and management need to function effectively.144 
Typically, shareholder engagement is a perfunctory matter 
that takes place only during, or in connection with, certain re-
quired or scheduled events, such as annual meetings, earnings 
releases, analysts’ calls, or public announcements.145 This is not 
effective communication and engagement. Recently, and espe-
cially in light of the increasing frequency of activist attacks, com-
 
 140. Larry Fink, BlackRock Inc, A Sense of Purpose, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard 
.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose. 
 141. James D.C. Barrall, Building Relationships with Your Shareholders 
Through Effective Communication, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Nov. 13, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/13/building 
-relationships-with-your-shareholders-through-effective-communication (“Over 
the last four decades, a competing paradigm of shareholder democracy has 
emerged. Today, shareholders demand increasing input on decisions that, under 
the old paradigm, unquestionably would have remained in the purview of the 
board’s or management’s business judgment.”). 
 142. The board of directors has the statutory authority to manage the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation, while the management officers are chosen 
by the board and report to it. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 142 (2018).  
 143. But see id. § 351 (management by stockholders in a statutory “close cor-
poration” if elected under Delaare law). 
 144. For institutional investors to comply with their own fiduciary duties to 
invest prudently, they must have the information necessary to evaluate the per-
formance of the companies in which they invest and the directors to whom they 
have delegated managerial responsibility. 
 145. TARUN MEHTA, ISS CORP. SERVS., SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: MAX-
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panies are considering more active forms of shareholder engage-
ment.146 Suggestions include increasing the frequency of commu-
nications, providing shareholders with direct access to board 
members or chairs of board committees, and expanding methods 
to reach shareholders beyond those that are legally required.147 
The changing nature of the equity markets makes the ne-
cessity for more direct, consistent, and routinized engagement 
imperative. More than thirty percent of the market value of eq-
uity assets under management are held in passive investment 
vehicles such as index funds, electronically traded funds, and 
some mutual funds.148 These investors are long-term owners 
and, because of that fact, have a greater interest in the govern-
ance of the firms they own.149 As these investors hold a larger 
percentage of shares than other shareholders, their voices may 
be heard, but there is no effective process for them to be heard 
on a regular basis. 
 
 146. Tom Johnson, Shareholder Engagement: An Evolving Landscape, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2017), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/09/shareholder-engagement-an-evolving 
-landscape. 
 147. MEHTA, supra note 145, at 2–5; Paula Loop, Engagement: New Impera-
tives, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 30, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/30/engagement-new-imperatives.  
There are even firms that specialize in advising companies on shareholder 
engagement. See, e.g., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Engagement, 
COOLEY, https://www.cooley.com/services/practice/corporate-governance 
-shareholder-engagement (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). 
 148. Ed Batts, BlackRock Talks . . . and U.S. Companies Must Listen, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://corpgov 
.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/13/blackrock-talks-and-u-s-companies-must-listen. 
Passive investing is an investing strategy that tracks a market-weighted index 
or portfolio.  
 149. See Fink, supra note 140 (“Globally, investors’ increasing use of index 
funds is driving a transformation in BlackRock’s fiduciary responsibility and 
the wider landscape of corporate governance. In the $1.7 trillion in active funds 
we manage, BlackRock can choose to sell the securities of a company if we are 
doubtful about its strategic direction or long-term growth. In managing our in-
dex funds, however, BlackRock cannot express its disapproval by selling the 
company’s securities as long as that company remains in the relevant index. As 
a result, our responsibility to engage and vote is more important than ever. In 
this sense, index investors are the ultimate long-term investors—providing pa-
tient capital for companies to grow and prosper.”). Recently several of the larg-
est institutional investors have combined to form the Investor Stewardship 
Group (ISG) and have promulgated a Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Gov-
ernance, which went into effect on January 1, 2018. See INVESTOR STEWARD-
SHIP GROUP, https://isgframework.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). ISG, however, 
does not have a mechanism for having its voice heard, as is proposed herein 
through the shareholder advisory committee. 
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If shareholder engagement and shareholder democracy are 
to take a leap forward, they need to be part of a formal process 
in which shareholders participate with companies and start to 
work together in more proactive ways. As proposed in this Arti-
cle, the time has come to institutionalize shareholder engage-
ment through the creation of shareholder advisory committees 
(SACs). The adoption of SACs can fundamentally improve the 
shareholder-management relationship. 
While the creation, structure, and scope of these committees 
can vary, the principle point is that SACs should become a fun-
damental part of the corporate governance framework. At a min-
imum, the committee would regularly meet to receive infor-
mation from the board and management and to provide feedback 
and advice to the board and management. At a maximum, the 
SACs could be tasked with nominating candidates for election to 
the board, setting board compensation, approving of settlement 
of shareholder derivative suits, and providing input on corporate 
financings, acquisitions, and other fundamental actions.150 
Whatever the scope of the SACs’ activity, the first step is to in-
stitutionalize its role as a communication conduit from the 
shareholders as a whole to the board and management. 
There are various models by which a shareholder advisory 
committee could be created and function. A starting point might 
be the shareholder bankruptcy committees permitted under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.151 The Bankruptcy Code 
provides that: “On request of a party in interest, the court may 
order the appointment of additional committees . . . of equity se-
curity holders if necessary to assure [their] adequate represen-
tation.”152 Furthermore, it states that a “committee of equity se-
curity holders appointed under subsection (a)(2) of this section 
shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold 
the seven largest amounts of equity securities of the debtor of 
the kinds represented on such committee.”153 
Under Chapter 11, these committees are given the duty and 
power to represent the equity security holders and may:  
 
 150. In some states board committees can consist of persons who are not 
board members and who can be delegated authority from the board to act on 
behalf of the corporation. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 2 (2018). That is, 
the SAC could have real power and be more than simply advisory. 
 151. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–74 (2012).  
 152. Id. § 1102(a)(2). 
 153. Id. § 1102(b)(2). 
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(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the ad-
ministration of the case;  
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condi-
tion of the debtor . . . ;  
(3) participate in the formulation of [reorganization] plan[s] . . . ;  
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner . . . ; and  
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of the equity se-
curity holders.”154 The bankruptcy committee also has the power “with 
the court’s approval . . . [to] select and authorize the employ-
ment . . . [of ]  attorneys, accountants, or other agents to represent or 
perform services for such committee.”155 
The nature and extent of the role of these shareholder bank-
ruptcy committees can provide a guide for how SACs might be 
employed outside of the bankruptcy context.  
There are also mandatory and voluntary models from other 
countries. In Sweden, shareholders are given the role of the nom-
inating/corporate governance committee of a U. S. company.156 
The Swedish Nominating Committee is mandatory and consists 
of at least three members, appointed by the shareholders, all of 
which must be shareholders themselves and a majority of which 
must be independent of the company and its executive manage-
ment.157 Neither the chief executive officer nor other members of 
the executive management can be members of the nominating 
committee.158 The Swedish Nominating Committee proposes 
candidates for the board and board compensation whose pro-
posals are acted upon at the shareholders’ meeting.159 
As a voluntary model, a French company, Groupe PSA 
(Groupe),160 has a SAC that acts as a consultative body to relay 
the expectations of the shareholders and to help develop share-
holder communication resources.161 The committee consists of 
 
 154. Id. § 1103(c). 
 155. Id. § 1103(a). 
 156.  Svensk kod fÖr bolagsstyrning [Corporate Governance Code] 3: 2 
(Swed.). 
 157. Id. at 3:2.1. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Groupe PSA is a French multinational manufacturer of automobiles 
and motorcycles sold under the Peugeot, Citroën, DS, Opel, and Vauxhall 
brands. See GROUPE PSA, https://www.groupe-psa.com/en/automotive-group/ 
history (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). 
 161. See Shareholders’ Advisory Committee, GROUPE PSA, https://www 
.groupe-psa.com/en/finance/individual-shareholders/advisory-committee (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2019). Some other French companies have shareholder advisory 
committees. For example, AXA, a global insurance company, has a shareholder 
advisory committee, which was created “to establish a regular and meaningful 
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twelve shareholder members elected for three-year terms, with 
one-third of the members up for election each year.162 Committee 
membership is intended to reflect the Groupe’s diversified own-
ership interest and be a balanced representation of its retail 
shareholder base.163 
The Bankruptcy Code shareholder committee, Swedish 
Nominating Committee, and Groupe SAC are at least three ways 
that SACs could be implemented. As an initial matter, publicly 
held companies in the United States may be wise to explore the 
use of SACs on a voluntary basis, both from an engagement per-
spective and to be proactive in order to avoid a possible regula-
tory mandate for their creation. Although historically, such for-
ward-looking action might be unlikely for most public 
companies,164 this would be a great way to work with some of the 
company’s largest shareholders and to garner their trust and 
support in advance of any activist shareholder attack. 
Beyond voluntary creation, the push for engagement be-
tween shareholders, the board, and management through the 
creation of SACs could be accomplished in the manner of some 
of the previously discussed shareholder democracy victories, 
that is, through the shareholder proposal process. Institutional 
investors could create a template resolution to be presented to 
corporate boards on SACs in the same manner that majority vot-
ing and proxy access resolutions were championed in the past.165 
The resolutions would get managements’ attention and, at some 
point, those resolutions may garner majority shareholder votes, 
which would be difficult for management to ignore. 
Finally, shareholder advisory groups could be implemented 
by regulatory mandate. Indeed, there is history to build upon. 
 
dialogue between the company and its individual shareholders.” See Advisory 
Committee for Individual Shareholders, AXA, https://group.axa.com/en/about 
-us/commitee/advisory-committee-individual-shareholders (last visited Jan. 30, 
2019). The committee has twelve members, attempts to reflect the occupational 
and geographical diversity of the body of AXA shareholders, and meets twice a 
year to examine various issues. Id. 
 162. Shareholders’ Advisory Committee, supra note 161. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Barrall, supra note 141 (“Historically, despite some management en-
gagement with shareholders, companies have seen little in the way of direct 
dialogue between shareholders and members of the board of directors. For most 
public companies, governance strategies have seldom included systematic en-
gagement with shareholders beyond quarterly earnings calls, investor confer-
ences and traditional investor relations efforts.”).  
 165. See supra Part II.A.2–A.5. 
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Prior to 2002, there was no substantial federal regulation of cor-
porate boards of directors or of their committees.166 In 2002, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act instituted sweeping governance changes 
and called for the SEC to implement rules and procedures on 
various topics.167 The SEC prodded the national stock exchanges 
to make changes to the governance structure of public corpora-
tions and the stock exchanges responded.168 As a result, today 
all publicly traded companies must have three board commit-
tees, a nominating/corporate governance committee, a compen-
sation committee, and an audit committee, all composed of inde-
pendent directors.169 The SEC could once again mandate that 
the stock exchanges take action, requiring companies to imple-
ment SACs. After all, one of the fundamental purposes of federal 
regulation of the securities markets is to enhance the flow of in-
formation between companies and shareholders.170 The required 
creation of SACs would help ensure that reliable information 
flows between the company and its shareholder base by putting 
a group of shareholders in direct contact with the board and 
management.171 
Shareholders will undoubtedly be interested in providing in-
put on board size, composition, compensation, and diversity by 
way of an SAC. Other topics of shareholder interest may be ex-
ecutive compensation (say on pay), changes in the corporate gov-
ernance documents, mergers or other fundamental changes, 
business strategy and development, and environmental and so-
cial issues. Whether proposed by shareholders as a resolution for 
board adoption under the proxy rules or mandated by the SEC 
 
 166. With adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related Securities 
and Exchange Commission regulations, the federal government has taken a 
more direct role in corporate governance regulation. Robert B. Thompson, Col-
laborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal 
Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 962 (2003).  
 167. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 168. See NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003). 
 169. Id. at 64,157–58. 
 170. See Aguilar, supra note 51 (“As you well know, disclosure is the founda-
tion of our federal securities laws. Fair and accurate disclosure has been the 
central goal of U.S. securities laws for 80 years.”). 
 171. See also id. (“In doing all this, institutional investors—like all inves-
tors—depend on the assurance of a level playing field, access to complete and 
reliable information, and the ability to exercise their rights as shareowners. 
That is why fair and intelligent regulation is necessary for the proper function-
ing of our capital markets.”). 
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through the stock exchanges, a sample formulation for the crea-
tion, constitution, and function of an SAC might look as follows: 
  The Company shall have a Shareholder Advisory Committee to ad-
vise the Board of Directors and the management on the interests of 
shareholders. The Committee shall be composed of at least nine mem-
bers selected on an annual basis. The Board shall establish appropriate 
procedures for selection of members, provided that 1) each member 
must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of 
the company’s securities for at least one year;172 2) no member has any 
affiliation with the Company other than as a shareholder; 3) at least 
three members are selected from the 20 largest owners of the Com-
pany’s voting shares; and 4) the Committee has diverse representation 
among types and classes of shareholders. Members of the Committee 
shall serve without compensation, except that the Committee shall be 
reimbursed for normal travel and operating expenses. 
  The Committee shall advise the Board on 1) the size of the Board 
and potential nominees to the Board of Directors, including enhancing 
and maintaining Board diversity; 2) creation of and appointment to 
Board committees; 3) compensation of the Board and management; 4) 
fundamental corporate changes, such as proposed amendments to the 
Company’s certificate and bylaws, 5) mergers, acquisitions, recapitali-
zations, and similar transactions; 6) business strategy and develop-
ment; 7) environmental, social and governance matters; and 8) other 
matters on which the Board seeks the Committee’s input and advice. 
The Board of Directors shall ensure the formation and effective opera-
tion of this Committee, with adequate resources to carry out the Com-
mittee’s functions, including allowing Committee retention of experts 
or advisors to the Committee, as necessary. The Board shall give due 
consideration to such advice and proposals as shall be reported by this 
Committee to the Board. The Company’s proxy statement and annual 
report shall report on the activities of the Committee. 
  The Committee shall be open to communication with, input from 
and actively engage with other shareholders who are not currently on 
the Committee, and report to the Board and other shareholders on such 
communication and the Committee’s responsiveness. 
This proposal is intentionally skeletal. The specifics of the 
SAC may vary from company to company, crafted ideally after 
consultation with representatives from the company’s share-
holder base. For example, the terms for SAC members may be 
one year or longer. If longer, the terms might be staggered so as 
to provide for continuity on the committee.173 Representatives on 
the SAC may be self-nominated. If there are more shareholder 
representatives seeking to participate than spots on the SAC, 
 
 172. This language and these ownership requirements are identical to those 
under the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule for shareholders who want the com-
pany to include a proposal in the company’s proxy statement. See Shareholder 
Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2018). It is intended to ensure that the 
shareholder has some substantial and longer-term interest in the company. 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 61–67. 
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the company’s board can either expand the SAC or provide a 
means for selecting among the nominees. Similarly, positions on 
the SAC may be reserved for long-term or large shareholders, or 
representatives of other shareholder types. 
SACs have the potential to solve one corporate communica-
tion and governance problem, that is, ensuring that sharehold-
ers as a group have a representative and continuing voice in 
dealing with management and the board. This solution only en-
hances shareholder democracy to a certain point. If individual 
shareholders are given special access to the corporate govern-
ance process, SACs’ effectiveness can be muted, if not negated. 
The next Part discusses the uneven access that corporate boards 
and management grant to activist investors through special in-
terest governance agreements, a process that counteracts SACs’ 
enhancing effect on shareholder democracy.   
III.  THE PROBLEMS WITH SPECIAL INTEREST 
GOVERNANCE AGREEMENTS   
“Activists are in fact the public company’s unlikely sav-
iours. . . . [A]ctivists are a force for good.”174 
 
“In short, activist hedge funds are vultures, not saviors. They seek to 
feed off the healthy as well as the sick, and encourage vulture-like be-
havior in others, corrupting those who should know better, like school-
teachers’ pension funds.”175 
 
Activist investors come in many shapes and sizes. They may 
be hedge funds, institutional investors, or individuals.176 Simi-
larly, investor activism can take many forms, and can have many 
objectives. The key common denominator among the different 
shapes, sizes, forms, and objectives is change.177 That change 
 
 174. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes: Why Activist Investors Are Good for the 
Public Company, ECONOMIST (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/ 
leaders/2015/02/05/capitalisms-unlikely-heroes. 
 175. Steve Denning, The Seven Deadly Sins of Activist Hedge Funds, FORBES 
(Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/02/15/the 
-seven-deadly-sins-of-activist-hedge-funds. 
 176. See Loop et al., supra note 3 (describing the attributes and proclivities 
of the three main types of activist investors: hedge funds, institutional inves-
tors, and individuals). 
 177. Id. (“Activism is about driving change. Shareholders turn to it when 
they think management isn’t maximizing a company’s potential. Activism can 
include anything from a full-blown proxy contest that seeks to replace the entire 
board, to shareholder proposals asking for policy changes or disclosure on some 
issue. In other cases, shareholders want to meet with a company’s executives or 
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may include seeking a sale or breakup of the company, challeng-
ing the board and management’s operational path, replacing the 
CEO, demanding a special dividend to shareholders, discussing 
financial control or reporting issues, and addressing a lack of re-
sponsiveness on environmental or social concerns.178 
One of the issues surrounding shareholder activism, widely 
discussed and written about, is so-called short-termism.179 
Scholars and commentators argue that activist shareholders 
with only short-term interests may seek, and bring about, sub-
stantial changes that harm the prospects of some of the corpora-
tion’s long-term goals.180 Hedge funds and other activists fre-
quently pressure boards and management to take actions, such 
as stock buybacks, special dividends, spin-offs, and other corpo-
rate reorganizations that will boost immediate stock prices.181 
Resources that are used for these short-term activities are then 
unavailable for projects with a longer time frame or potential re-
turn, such as product research and development.182 What’s 
worse, shareholder activists are not restrained by fiduciary du-
ties to the company183 and therefore are free to act as they 
wish.184 
 
directors to discuss their concerns and urge action. The form activism takes of-
ten depends on the type of investor and what they want.”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Ques-
tion We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their 
Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. L. 1 (2010). But 
see Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 10 (arguing that the shareholders’ ability to 
intervene results in the long-term benefits to the company, shareholders, and 
economy); see also Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015) (stating there is no empirical 
evidence supporting the argument that interventions by hedge funds impact 
long-term goals of the companies and shareholders detrimentally). 
 180. See supra note 179. 
 181. EMMERICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 446.  
 182. See Tomislav Ladika & Zacharias Sautner, Managerial Short-Termism 
and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting (Aug. 17, 2018) (un-
published manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2286789. 
 183. See EMMERICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 447. 
 184. Institutional investors and hedge funds do owe fiduciary duties to their 
owners. Another identified concern is the fact that shareholder activists may 
disregard the interests of those whose shares they manage. These duties may 
conflict with their duties if they become members of a target company’s board 
of directors. See Kai Haakon E. Liekefett, Think Twice Before Settling with an 
Activist, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/22/think-twice-before-settling-with-an 
-activist. In order to make sure direct stockholders (i.e. mutual funds and hedge 
funds) act in the best interests of those whose money they manage, some suggest 
that activist investors should bear some costs they impose and disclose more 
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This Article’s concern, however, is not with the activist in-
vestor’s identity, his or her investment time frame, or even 
whether his or her actions bring value or not. Rather, the con-
cern is with the process that has evolved whereby an activist in-
vestor acquires some small percentage of company shares, de-
mands managerial and operational change, may threaten a 
proxy contest to oust the board, and then settles by entering into 
a private agreement with the company without the knowledge, 
participation, or approval of the remaining shareholders.185 
More importantly, these special interest agreements provide 
benefits to the activist, primarily in the form of immediate ap-
pointment to the board of directors, that are inconsistent with 
corporate governance and that are purchased by the board as the 
price of peace.186 
Some have said that the corporate raiders of the 1980s have 
simply rebranded themselves and are the activist investors of 
today.187 This analogy is inapt. The corporate raiders of the 
1980s typically sought to acquire the company at a premium 
 
information about their incentives. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Or-
dinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists 
of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 476, 488–91 (2014); accord Usha 
Rogrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from 
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. Rev. 1822, 1848–55 (2010) (recognizing that the current 
shareholder empowerment reform is an imperfect way to address systemic risk 
and, under these circumstances, arguing the best empowerment reform strat-
egy should consider aligning the interests of individual investors with the inter-
ests of their intermediaries through which they invest).  
 185. Activist interventions resulting in settlements need not always be re-
lated to proxy fights. Between 2000 and 2011, there were over 2000 activist in-
terventions in publicly held companies, whether or not directly involving a 
proxy fight, with the percentage of settlements increasing each year. See Beb-
chuk et al., supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 186. As for motivations of the actors involved in such settlement agreements, 
some scholars have suggested that boards are motivated to avoid the costs, dis-
tractions and negative publicity associated with proxy contests. Derek D. Bork, 
Settlement Agreements with Activist Investors–the Latest Entrenchment Device, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2016), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/07/settlement-agreements-with-activist 
-investors-the-latest-entrenchment-device. Some have argued that the boards 
have started to recognize the value that activists and other shareholder repre-
sentatives can bring to a board. Id. Others have reasoned that the drivers be-
hind settlements may be not so noble, but rather settlements have become a 
defensive measure and entrenchment device to handcuff the activists while al-
lowing the board to maintain control. Id. 
 187. Aaran Fronda, The Rebranding of Corporate Raiders, WORLD FIN. 
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.worldfinance.com/strategy/the-rebranding-of 
-corporate-raiders. 
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price out of which all shareholders received a pro rata cut. To-
day’s activist investor does not seek to acquire the company. Ra-
ther, the activist investor typically threatens a proxy fight to un-
seat the board.188 If the battle proceeds to a vote, all shareholders 
can vote as to whom they want running their corporation. On the 
other hand, if the activist investor settles its challenge prior to a 
vote with a private agreement between it and the board, other 
shareholders do not have any say in the result. Thus, these 
agreements eliminate the shareholder voices that SACs, and 
shareholder democracy in general, sought to enhance. This is the 
danger of special interest governance agreements. 
Long-term institutional investors have raised issues with 
this process. In the aggregate, shareholder activists hold a very 
small percentage of public company stock, which is not enough 
to play a determinative role in vote outcomes.189 To succeed in 
proxy contests and other campaigns, activists depend on the sup-
port of the large institutional investors that dominate the share 
ownership space.190 However, activists do not need this support 
if the company enters into a private interest agreement. Moreo-
ver, settlements with individual activists have been happening 
so quickly that a number of institutional investors have ex-
pressed their concerns that companies are both entering into set-
tlements without giving sufficient time for other shareholders to 
provide their views,191 and compromising long-term interests for 
short-term priorities.192 In fact, long-term institutional investors 
may prefer that the companies engage in a proxy fight in order 
to give long-term investors a chance to express their views and 
have their vote be counted.193 
How prevalent is this practice of activist investor special in-
terest governance agreements? 
 
 188. See Lipton, supra note 5.  
 189. Glen T. Schleyer et al., Sullivan & Cromwell Reviews and Analyzes 
2016 U.S. Shareholder Activism, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, at 3 (Dec. 15, 2016), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/12/15/sullivan-cromwell-reviews-and 
-analyzes-2016-u-s-shareholder-activism/. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 12.  
 192. Protecting Long-Term Shareholder Interests in Activist Engagements, 
Market Commentary, State Street Global Advisors (Oct. 10, 2016), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/10/17/protecting-the-interests-of-long-term 
-shareholders-in-activist-engagements/ [hereinafter State Street Global Advi-
sors]. 
 193. Liekefett, supra note 184. 
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Consider this comparison: In 2001, more than sixty percent 
of threatened proxy contests went to a vote and only twenty per-
cent resulted in special agreement settlements;194 in 2018, only 
twenty-two percent were carried to a vote and seventy-eight per-
cent settled with special agreements.195 It has been noted that 
“[w]hile such settlements used to be rare, they now occur with 
significant frequency.”196 Moreover, they are happening fast: 
“The time period between the beginning of an activist campaign 
and a settlement has contracted significantly—from 146 days in 
2013 to 60 days in 2016. Corporate America is capitulating.”197 
The next two Sections identify the benefits of these special deals 
to the activist and to the board, respectively.  
A. ACTIVIST BENEFITS—BOARD REPRESENTATION PLUS 
The crucial benefit activists gain in special interest settle-
ment agreements is immediate representation on boards of di-
rectors of target companies.198 The desire to infiltrate the board 
is not surprising. The goals typically identified by activists, such 
as operational changes, special dividends or stock buybacks, pos-
sible merger or sale, and replacing the CEO, are actions either 
 
 194. Id. The remaining ones either were abandoned or otherwise mooted. At 
least as important is the fact that “many companies are still choosing to grant 
board seats to activists before the campaign evolves into a proxy fight situation.” 
Andrew Birstingl, 2016 Shareholder Activism Trends, FACTSET (Dec. 12, 2016), 
https://insight.factset.com/2016-shareholder-activism-trends.  
 195. LAZARD LTD., LAZARD’S ANNUAL REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM – 
2018 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/450805/lazards-2018-review-of 
-shareholder-activism.pdf. In 2017 the numbers were even starker, with eighty-
six percent threatened activist contests leading to negotiated settlements. Jim 
Rossman, Review of Shareholder Activism: 1H 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 30, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2018/07/30/review-of-shareholder-activism-1h-2018; see also Liekefett, supra 
note 184. “The vast majority of activist situations result in a negotiated settle-
ment between the activist and the target company.” Id. 
 196. Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, at 2. These statistics relating specifically 
to proxy fights portray only a small portion of the actual activist interventions 
and resulting settlement agreements. Many activist interventions do not actu-
ally involve a proxy contest. Id. at 5–9. 
 197. Liekefett, supra note 184.  
 198. Rossman, supra note 195. In 2018 activists won 161 board seats, the 
largest number in history, up fifty-six percent from 2017 and eleven percent 
higher than the previous record of 145 seats in 2016. LAZARD LTD., supra note 
195, at 1.  
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fully delegated to the board or at least requires board initia-
tion.199 Board representation is thus a rational and essential 
means to accomplish these ends.200 
The problem here is the process by which activists acquire 
these board seats. They receive their seats without owning 
enough shares to elect their candidates, and without campaign-
ing for and obtaining a passing shareholder vote approving their 
nominees. The achievements of shareholder democracy, includ-
ing proxy access and majority shareholder voting for director 
election, are ignored—activists achieve the same result without 
following the rules that have been created for all.201 
Consider this situation. In March of 2016, activist hedge 
fund Starboard Value LP, which owned only 1.7% of Yahoo! Inc., 
threatened a proxy fight to replace the entire nine-member 
board of Yahoo, including Chief Executive Officer Marissa 
Mayer.202 Starboard stated that it was “extremely disappointed 
with Yahoo’s dismal financial performance, poor management 
execution, egregious compensation and hiring practices, and 
general lack of accountability and oversight by the Board.”203 Af-
ter only thirty-two days, and without any input or vote from 
other shareholders, Yahoo and Starboard settled. Starboard was 
granted four board seats and the Yahoo board immediately ex-
panded its size to thirteen members to accommodate these new 
members.204 Yahoo additionally promised to nominate those four 
 
 199. Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 200. Id. at 15–17. 
 201. “Since 2015, activists have secured 198 board seats at companies with 
market values above $500 million, according to data from Lazard Ltd (LAZ.N), 
with most of those seats gained through settlements. That is 30 percent more 
than the prior two full years combined.” Michael Flaherty, Big Funds Push Back 
Against Activist Investor Settlements, REUTERS (July 18, 2018), https://www 
.reuters.com/article/us-activist-investors/big-funds-push-back-against-activist 
-investor-settlements-idUSKCN0ZY2DP. 
 202. Yahoo Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinaf-
ter Schedule 14A]; Michael Flaherty & Supantha Mukherjee, Starboard 




 204. Yahoo Inc., Schedule 13D (Form 13D) (June 25, 2014) [hereinafter Ya-
hoo Form 13D]. Starboard also got representation on all board committees. Sec-
tion 3.2 of the bylaws of Yahoo allow the board to set the size of the board. See 
Yahoo Inc., Amended and Restated Bylaws (Form 8-K) (Exhibit 3.2) (June 27, 
2014). 
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Starboard directors for election at the next annual meeting and 
to reduce the board to eleven at that time.205 
What is wrong with this process and result? Starboard only 
owned 1.7% of Yahoo’s stock and it got four of its personal de-
signees appointed to the Yahoo board without any shareholder 
vote or approval. Whether the Yahoo board was made up of nine, 
eleven, or thirteen members, Starboard’s meager ownership per-
centage would not have permitted it to elect any directors in the 
normal course of conduct. Even under the most minority share-
holder friendly voting process, cumulative voting—which was 
not in place at Yahoo206—Starboard would not have had the abil-
ity to elect even one director. Rather, Starboard would have had 
to own more than four times the number of shares it actually 
owned to elect one Yahoo board member and would have had to 
own nearly thirty percent of Yahoo’s stock in order to elect four 
members to a thirteen-member board.207 Moreover, the Yahoo 
board unilaterally agreed to expand the size of the Yahoo board 
immediately in order to make room for the Starboard represent-
atives. This is special interest governance. 
The true irony of this situation is that Yahoo previously had 
amended its bylaws to adopt a majority vote standard for the 
election of directors in response to the move for majority voting 
in director elections,208 as discussed above.209 No shareholder 
vote, however, was ever taken at Yahoo for Starboard to get four 
board seats.210 The process that the Yahoo shareholders had ad-
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Schedule 14A, supra note 202, at 14 (“Shareholders are not entitled to 
cumulate votes in the election of directors.”). Cumulative voting allows a minor-
ity shareholder to get representation on the board of directors depending on the 
percentage of shares owned and the number of directors up for election.  
 207. Cumulative voting allows shareholders to cumulate their votes in the 
election of directors. The formula for determining the percentage necessary to 
elect one director is to divide 100 by the number of directors to be elected plus 
one. Here that would be 100 divided by 13 or 7.14%. To elect four directors a 
shareholder would need four times that amount, or 28.57%. 
 208. Schedule 14A, supra note 202 (“Our Bylaws provide that, in an uncon-
tested election, each director nominee must receive a majority of votes cast in 
order to be elected to the Board. A ‘majority of votes cast’ means the number of 
shares voted ‘FOR’ a director nominee exceeds the number of shares voted 
‘AGAINST’ that director nominee.”). 
 209. See text accompanying supra notes 68–85. 
 210. It is a complete fallacy to argue that this process is validated because 
“[d]irectors who enter the board through settlements do not receive less voting 
support at the following annual general meeting than incumbent directors or 
those activist directors who get on the board without a settlement.” Bebchuk et 
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vocated for, and accomplished, was undone instantly by Star-
board and the Yahoo board. They sidestepped the normal gov-
ernance channels and made a mockery of the majority vote re-
quirement. 
One further example is Hertz. On August 12, 2014, Carl 
Icahn, the owner of 8.48% of the Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. 
stock, reported that he “intend[ed] to have discussions with rep-
resentatives of the Issuer’s management and board of directors 
relating to shareholder value, accounting issues, operational 
failures, underperformance relative to its peers and the Report-
ing Persons’ lack of confidence in management. The Reporting 
Persons may also seek shareholder board representation if ap-
propriate.”211 Once again, this last statement portends a poten-
tial proxy fight. Thirty-five days later, Hertz and Icahn settled, 
without any shareholder vote, with Icahn immediately receiving 
three board seats on the nine-member Hertz board.212 
Absent the settlement with Hertz, Hertz’s governing docu-
ment would have required Icahn’s board nominees to be elected 
by a “[m]ajority of shares cast.”213 Even under a cumulative vot-
ing regime, which Hertz did not have, Icahn would have needed 
more than ten percent stock ownership to elect even one director 
to the Hertz board, which he did not have. To elect three direc-
tors, he would have needed more than thirty percent. To make 
matters worse, the Hertz board had one of the few remaining 
classified boards. When the Hertz board settled with Icahn to 
avoid a proxy fight, they appointed his nominees to classes of 
directors that would not be up for shareholder election at the 
2015 annual meeting.214 Two of the Icahn directors would not be 
up for shareholder election until 2016 and one would not be up 
for election until 2017.215 Now that’s a sweet deal for Carl Icahn 
and a sad day for shareholder democracy and corporate govern-
ance at Hertz. 
 
al., supra note 7, at 5. Investors who do not agree with the special deal and way 
the company is being run may well take the Wall Street Walk and sell their 
shares before the next meeting. In any event, once the activist appointees are 
on the board and are recommended by the board for approval as part of the 
standard slate, election is all but guaranteed. See text accompanying supra 
notes 105–07. 
 211. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., Schedule 13D (Form 13D) (Aug. 12, 2014). 
 212. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., Form 8-K (Sept. 16, 2014). 
 213. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., Def 14A, at 2 (Sept. 16, 2014). 
 214. Id. at 12. 
 215. Id. 
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These are not isolated examples. Activist investors typically 
demand board representation as an essential part of the settle-
ment package, with 87.4% of settlements resulting in the ap-
pointment of new directors either affiliated with the activist or 
approved by them.216 The trend continued in 2017, with settle-
ments granting an average of 1.7 board seats to activists.217 
Moreover, while board seats are the main prize, there are other 
gifts that activists receive as part of these special interest settle-
ments. Seventy-five percent of these settlements provide that 
the activist board members be appointed to all, or at least the 
most important, board committees.218 Moreover, companies of-
ten agree to reimburse the activist, out of company funds, for the 
expenses incurred in negotiating and executing the settlement 
agreement.219 As will be seen in the next Section, while the ben-
efits to activists are substantial, the deal is not completely one-
sided. 
B. BOARD BENEFITS—PEACE AT A HIGH PRICE FOR OTHER 
SHAREHOLDERS 
The special interest deals are not as one-sided as one might 
think. Boards have secured some significant self-serving benefits 
as well.220 The key to the settlement from the board’s side is to 
halt the challenge to incumbent management, and to secure the 
activist’s commitment not to push for further change. These are 
referred to as standstill provisions.221 
For example, in late 2017, Sea World settled with an activ-
ist, Hill Path Capital, with a standstill containing the following 
terms, among others: Hill Path could not (1) vote its shares, or 
communicate with anyone else to have them vote their shares, 
except for board candidates recommended by the board or for ac-
tions recommended by the board of management; (2) acquire 
more Sea World shares; (3) sell its shares to anyone who would 
own five percent or more of Sea World stock; (4) make any pro-
posal at any regular or special meeting of shareholders; (5) pro-
pose or help anyone else to propose any merger, tender offer, or 
 
 216. Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, at 16. 
 217. J.P. MORGAN, THE 2017 PROXY SEASON at 12 (2017), https://www 
.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320739681811.pdf. 
 218.  GIBSON DUNN, 2017 YEAR-END ACTIVISM UPDATE 16–20 (2018), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2017-Year-End 
-Activism-Update.pdf; see also Yahoo Form 13D, supra note 204.  
 219. GIBSON DUNN, supra note 218, at 18. 
 220. Schleyer, supra note 189, at 13.  
 221. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, at 6. 
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similar transaction to other shareholders, (6) make any request 
for Sea World’s books or records; (7) seek, or assist anyone else 
to seek, changing the board or management of the company: (8) 
institute any litigation against Sea World, its board, or its man-
agement; and (9) make, or assist or encourage anyone else to 
make, any public statement inconsistent with support of the 
board or management.222 
These provisions handcuff and gag Hill Capital. It cannot 
acquire more shares, even by means of a premium price purchase 
offer to all other shareholders. The provisions clearly insulated 
the Sea World board from further attack by Hill Capital, but it 
is not clear how they benefitted the company itself or the other 
shareholders. Indeed, the board appears to have sold board seats 
to the activist at a price that unduly entrenches the board and 
incumbent management. These activist concessions do not serve 
the interests of the company (or the other shareholders) other 
than to take the spotlight off the board. 
Even if a board could reasonably expect to have an activist 
call off its proxy contest in return for board seats and other ben-
efits without standstill provisions, boards often get a longer com-
mitment from the activist in the provisions. The typical stand-
still provision spans 1.4 annual meeting cycles.223 This means 
that the activist may be prohibited from taking any of the iden-
tified actions not only for the year it has been guaranteed board 
representation, but also for the next election cycle as well. Alt-
hough this too does not necessarily benefit the general share-
holder base, it does provide the board extended protection from 
the activist’s further challenge. 
This is not to say that all agreements between companies 
and activists are inherently bad. Rather, the point is that, by 
unilaterally entering into such shareholder settlement agree-
ments, boards undermine the past achievements of shareholder 
democracy to the detriment of shareholders who are left out of 
the process. The most significant institutional shareholders have 
voiced their “wariness about rapid settlements with activists 
without the input of long-term shareholders.”224 These concerns 
 
 222. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., Form 8-K (Nov. 7, 2017). These are typ-
ical standstill provisions. See Bork, supra note 186.  
 223. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 217, at 12. 
 224. CAMBERVIEW PARTNERS, Responding to Investor Concerns Regarding 
Activist Settlements, http://camberview.com/images/news/1312093355269978 
62.pdf. As stated by the head of the largest global institutional shareholder, 
BlackRock:  
Where activists do offer valuable ideas — which is more often than 
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are real and deserve a resolution. The next Part turns to one po-
tential resolution.  
IV.  SOLVING THE SPECIAL INTEREST SETTLEMENT 
GOVERNANCE PROBLEM   
The challenge for corporate law is to facilitate the development of a 
corporate structure that allows management the discretion to utilize 
its expertise on behalf of shareholders, but at the same time establishes 
safeguards in situations in which management might utilize that dis-
cretion to favor itself at the expense of shareholders.225 
 
In entering into special interest settlement agreements, 
boards and management are operating in a conflict of interest 
context. They are obligated to represent the best interests of the 
company and the shareholders as a whole. Yet an activist poses 
a clear, vocal, and direct challenge to the board’s and manage-
ment’s credibility as business persons, to their business plan for 
the company, and to their fundamental ability to continue in 
their current positions. It is a personal and professional attack. 
For outside board members, this means a potential loss of pres-
tige and significant income, ranging from $200,000 to $300,000 
per year,226 with the top twenty highest paid boards’ directors 
receiving from $346,000 to over $2,000,000 per year.227 Of 
course, for the CEO and other management members, the stakes 
are even higher, with their jobs and even higher income at 
risk.228  
The next Section posits that the resolution of this special in-
terest governance problem requires a return to basic legal rules 
 
some detractors suggest — we encourage companies to begin discus-
sions early, to engage with shareholders like BlackRock, and to bring 
other critical stakeholders to the table. But when a company waits un-
til a proxy proposal to engage or fails to express its long-term strategy 
in a compelling manner, we believe the opportunity for meaningful di-
alogue has often already been missed. 
Fink, supra note 140, at 2. 
 225. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 384 (AM. LAW INST. 1994). 
 226. Eric Graves & Thomas Kohns, 2016 Director Compensation Report, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (DEC. 12, 2016), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/12/2016-director-compensation-report. 
 227. The 20 Highest-Paid S&P 500 Boards of Directors, EQUILAR BLOG (Oct. 
5, 2016), http://www.equilar.com/blogs/162-highest-paid-directors.html. 
 228. The Economic Policy Institute found that “in 2016 CEOs in America’s 
largest firms made an average of $15.6 million in compensation.” Lawrence 
Mishel & Jessica Schieder, CEO Pay Remains High Relative to the Pay of Typi-
cal Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 20, 2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/ 
130354.pdf. 
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governing corporate activities and an application of those rules 
to the activist settlement scenario. The following Section pro-
poses a process for harnessing special interest settlement agree-
ments consistent with the applicable legal standards. That reso-
lution is embodied in a model provision to be adopted by 
companies or imposed by regulators.  
A. APPLICABLE CORPORATE LAW PRINCIPLES 
There is a need to balance the board of directors’ authority 
to manage the business and affairs of the corporation with the 
concern over conflict of interest in special interest governance 
settlements. These are situations where the board’s duty of loy-
alty is implicated. There are several corporate law principles 
that may guide formulating that balance and providing a resolu-
tion. 
A starting point is the hostile takeover context and the adop-
tion of defensive measures. In this context, which has elements 
akin to activist threats, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,229 acknowledged an inevitable 
board conflict of interest. It stated, “[b]ecause of the omnipresent 
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, 
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there 
is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the 
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule 
may be conferred.”230 There, the Court imposed an obligation 
that the board demonstrate the necessity for any defensive 
measure before they may adopt it.231 
Although adopting takeover defense measures has similari-
ties to special interest agreements with activist investors, the 
conflict is even more acute in the activist context. In the latter 
situation, without exception, the activist is directly confronting 
the board and management as to its capacity and performance. 
The activist is looking to change the board or management in 
order to facilitate further operational changes, a special payment 
to shareholders, or a sale or breakup of the company. The board’s 
 
 229. 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985). Delaware law is used here as the statu-
tory and judicial example because it is the leading corporate law state and a 
majority of publicly held companies are incorporated under Delaware law.  
 230. Id. at 954. 
 231. “In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effective-
ness existed because of another person’s stock ownership.” Id. 
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continued existence in its present form is at stake. The “omni-
present specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests” is real. The board should therefore be likewise obli-
gated to demonstrate the necessity of a special interest agree-
ment. 
A second analog between traditional corporate law and the 
activist investor settlement agreement situation is the so-called 
interested director transaction. In this setting, the board mem-
ber enters into a contract with the company in which the director 
has an interest in both sides of the contract’s contemplated 
transaction.232 In this context, the agreement is presumed to be 
“void or voidable.”233 One method to validate such contracts is for 
directors who are not implicated in the transaction to approve 
the contract, that is, if a “board or committee in good faith au-
thorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a 
majority of the disinterested directors.”234 Unfortunately, this 
approval method is not available in the context of special interest 
activist agreements. The board as a whole is directly interested 
in the outcome of the activist’s threat, and so none of the board 
members are appropriately “disinterested.” 
An alternative mechanism to validate director conflict of in-
terest transactions is independent shareholder approval.235 As 
such, an interested director agreement is not void or voidable if 
“[t]he material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship 
or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or 
are known to the stockholders entitled to vote thereon, and the 
contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by 
vote of the stockholders.”236 That is, to validate the agreement, 
interested directors must fully disclose the terms of the agree-
ment and all of the company’s shareholders must approve the 
agreement. This is a better fit for validating special interest ac-
tivist investor agreements. The board is conflicted, so the share-
holders should have the right to vote on the agreement. If direc-
tors decide not to pursue the validating vote, or if the vote is 
negative, the agreement is invalid. In this process, shareholder 
democracy is preserved. 
 
 232. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2018) (Interested directors; 
quorum). 
 233. Id. § 144(a). 
 234. Id. § 144(a)(1). 
 235. Id. § 144(a)(2). 
 236. Id.  
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A further aspect of activist settlement agreements impli-
cates traditional corporate jurisprudence. In almost all of these 
situations, the board and the activist settle their dispute in order 
to avoid an imminent proxy fight for board seats that would be 
decided by the shareholders as a whole in a vote at a shareholder 
meeting.237 Thus the non-activist shareholders lose the oppor-
tunity to decide the matter for themselves because the board and 
the activist preempt that right through the special interest 
agreement appointing the activist’s directors without a share-
holder meeting or vote. 
Delaware courts have been particularly diligent in protect-
ing the shareholder franchise from usurpation by board action. 
Interestingly, the initial case in this area involved action by a 
board to accelerate the date for the annual shareholder meeting 
to minimize the time for dissident shareholders to wage a proxy 
fight.238 The Court invalidated this attempt: 
[M]anagement has attempted to utilize the corporate machinery and 
the Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office; and, 
to that end, for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dis-
sident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy 
contest against management. These are inequitable purposes, contrary 
to established principles of corporate democracy.239 
Under this holding, the shareholder voting franchise is sacro-
sanct and the board must respect shareholders’ rights to express 
themselves on issues of corporate policy and governance.  
In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,240 the Court once 
again addressed the issue of board actions that thwart share-
holder democracy. The Atlas board added two directors in an at-
tempt to frustrate shareholder Blasius’ action to name a major-
ity of the board by exercising its shareholder right to elect 
directors. The Court held that the business judgment rule did 
not apply because “[a]ction designed principally to interfere with 
the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between 
the board and a shareholder majority.”241 Moreover, the Court 
stated that in such cases, a per se rule of invalidity was not ap-
propriate either. Rather, in such circumstances, the Court held 
 
 237. Schoenfeld, supra note 7 (“Investors motivate management and the 
board to come to the bargaining table by threatening to: wage a proxy fight”). 
 238. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
 239. Id. at 439. 
 240. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).  
 241. Id. at 660. 
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that “the board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a com-
pelling justification for such action.”242 In language with ringing 
applicability to the special interest agreements with activist in-
vestors this Article addresses, the Court stated that “[t]he duty 
of the courts to protect the stockholder vote is at its highest when 
the board action relates to the election of directors or other in-
stances of directorial control.”243 
It appears that special interest agreements between boards 
and activist investors, in which the activist names directors to 
the board without a shareholder vote, implicates elements of 
both the interested director transaction analysis and the inter-
ference with shareholder democracy analysis. Boards should not 
be able to bind the company to a self-interested agreement pro-
tecting their own positions without shareholder validation. 
Moreover, directors should not be able to usurp shareholders’ 
right to elect directors without a compelling justification. Apply-
ing the “compelling justification” standard is appropriate “in cir-
cumstances in which self-interested or faithless fiduciaries act to 
deprive stockholders of a full and fair opportunity to participate 
in the matter [to be voted on] and to thwart what appears to be 
the will of a majority of the stockholders.”244 Such circumstances 
are present in the activist shareholder settlement context. It 
would be wise to follow the guidance of corporate law to create a 
context-specific solution. The next Section presents such a solu-
tion. 
B. RESOLUTION: MANDATORY SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OR 
COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION 
In almost all circumstances, these special interest agree-
ments happen before an annual meeting of the shareholders, at 
which the shareholders would vote to elect the board.245 This is 
why the activist threatens a proxy contest. If the board unilater-
ally avoids the effectiveness of that vote by way of a preemptive 
 
 242. Id. at 661. The Delaware Supreme Court has adopted the Blasius “com-
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agreement with the activist, the shareholders lose any meaning-
ful right to decide if the activist directors should be on the 
board.246 
The key to preserving and enhancing shareholder democ-
racy in the activist investor settlement context is to give the 
other shareholders the opportunity to vote, no matter the subject 
of the vote. If the board is unable to avoid a shareholder vote, it 
may nonetheless determine the subject and content of the vote. 
If the board is allowed to enter into an agreement with the activ-
ist but must present that agreement for approval to the share-
holders as a whole, the board can make a choice. The board can 
either refuse to accede to the activist’s demands and proceed to 
a potential proxy fight, where the shareholders as a whole will 
decide which slate of directors to elect. Alternatively, the board 
can enter into an agreement with the activist, but must present 
that agreement to the shareholders as a whole for approval. Ei-
ther way, the shareholders’ right to determine who sits on the 
board of directors will be preserved. 
We recognize, however, the strong tradition of deference to 
corporate boards with respect to how they manage and direct the 
operations of the corporation. It appears contrary to these gen-
eral principles of board freedom to require shareholder approval 
for all agreements or situations in which the board may agree to 
appoint directors. For example, what if the board is engaging in 
a financing transaction with a third party investor and the in-
vestor is willing to take preferred stock so long as the investor 
gets a board seat? Here, there is no conflict and the board should 
be able to enter into that agreement without shareholder ap-
proval. Similarly, the company may engage in a joint venture 
with a third party, in which the third party wants to have board 
representation. The board should be able to make that appoint-
ment without seeking approval of the shareholders. Each of 
these are valid corporate transactions that may reasonably in-
volve a board appointment without any apparent conflict of in-
terest on the part of the board. 
Therefore, the best resolution of the special interest activist 
investor agreement conundrum is to provide that such an agree-
ment is invalid unless it receives shareholder approval, as in the 
case of shareholder approval of director conflict of interest trans-
 
 246. It is no answer to say that the remaining shareholders may later get to 
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actions generally, unless the board can demonstrate a compel-
ling justification for entering into the agreement without seek-
ing shareholder approval. Incidentally, but not insignificantly, 
creating the presumption that the agreement will be submitted 
to the shareholders increases shareholder engagement by re-
quiring that the issue be disclosed, explained, and voted upon, 
which is what the institutional shareholders have been seeking. 
Using the current Delaware interested director statute as a 
model, a proposed statute for the validation of activist investor 
agreements is set forth below, which might be new section 147 
of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Alternatively, the 
language could be revised slightly as a shareholder resolution for 
an amendment to the bylaws of any corporation. Approached in 
this manner, any institutional shareholder or shareholders could 
pursue a campaign, similar to those discussed above in connec-
tion with the destaggering of boards, majority voting for direc-
tors, and proxy access, with companies adopting the provision on 
an individual basis. Indeed, it is hoped that these proposals to 
individual companies, and the proposals’ adoptions, would be-
come the newest success of shareholder democracy. 
§ 147 Agreements Involving Appointment of Directors 
A contract or agreement between a corporation and a stockholder247 
(or its affiliates) under circumstances in which the stockholder’s (or its 
affiliates’) recommended candidates are to be named as directors to fill 
vacancies on the board of directors of the corporation and the stock-
holder (or its affiliates) agrees not to: 
  pursue a proxy contest with respect to the election, removal, re-
placement of the board;  
  acquire additional shares of the corporation’s stock;  
  vote its shares, or communicate with anyone else to have them vote 
their shares except for board candidates recommended by the board or 
for actions recommended by the board of management; 
  make any proposal at any regular or special meeting of sharehold-
ers; 
  propose or help anyone else to propose any merger, tender offer or 
similar transaction to other shareholders; 
  make any request for the corporation’s books or records; 
  seek, or assist anyone else to seek, changing the board or manage-
ment of the company; 
  institute any litigation against the company, its board or manage-
ment; or 
  make, or assist or encourage anyone else to make, any public state-
 
 247. The term “stockholder” is used in the statute instead of shareholder 
since that is the convention used in the Delaware corporate code. 
  
1696 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1649 
 
ment inconsistent with support of the board or management,is void un-
less (i) the material facts as to all of the terms of the contract or agree-
ment are disclosed or are known to the stockholders entitled to vote 
thereon, and the contract or agreement is specifically approved in good 
faith by vote of the stockholders, or (ii) the board bears the burden of 
demonstrating a compelling corporate justification for the contract or 
agreement, such as a merger, consolidation, joint venture, issuance of 
shares to raise capital, or other bona fide third party transaction. A 
compelling corporate justification does not result simply from the 
avoidance of a potential proxy fight, conservation of corporate or man-
agement resources, avoidance of negative publicity for the corporation, 
maintenance of the ability to pursue the corporation’s business plan 
without challenge or interference, or similar purported benefits. 
 
Reporter’s Notes 
This provision is designed to restrict the situations in which an activist 
acquires a stake in a company and then advocates for change. The ac-
tivist and the board then agree to settle the matter with the activist 
executing a standstill agreement in return for board seats. These set-
tlements usurp the authority of the shareholders in the election of di-
rectors because the board acts unilaterally to appoint the activist’s can-
didates to current or created vacancies on the board. These 
appointments are not made in connection with bona fide substantive 
transactions involving the corporation but rather primarily to curtail 
the activist investor’s threats to the board and incumbent manage-
ment. This provision requires that these activist investor settlements 
are invalid unless they receive approval of the stockholders of the cor-
poration in a stockholder vote. In operation, then, the proposed statute 
would require shareholder approval for all activist investor settle-
ments. In normal circumstances, that vote will occur at the next annual 
stockholder meeting. 
  The only exception to the requirement of a stockholder vote would 
be if the board can present a compelling corporate justification for the 
advance appointments to the board. The last sentence of the section is 
designed to eliminate the purported justifications often given by boards 
for settling with an activist investor. These and similar justifications 
are not compelling under the statute. Typically, only a bona fide trans-
action with a third party, such as a sale of preferred shares or joint 
venture, where board representation may be a typical attribute of that 
type of transaction, will support a showing of a compelling corporate 
justification for the board granting board seats in connection with en-
tering into a contract or other agreement. Finally, this provision does 
not prevent the board from appointing individuals to fill vacancies on 
the board in the normal course of affairs, such as when a director re-
tires or dies, or where the board might expand its size and appoint di-
rectors designed to improve board diversity. These appointments are 
not accompanied by any contract or agreement with the director, and 
certainly not one that prevents the director from engaging in the activ-
ities specified in parts (a) through (i), which are provisions are stand-
ard in activist investor settlement agreements. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Shareholder democracy’s development over the past quarter 
century has been amazing. Fueled by the growth of institutional 
investors, the SEC’s shareholder proposal process, and share-
holders’ desire to bring positive social change, significant corpo-
rate governance changes have been made, from majority voting 
for directors to a growing emphasis on environmental, social and 
governance issues. The time is ripe to find a way to make to in-
stitutionalize engagement between shareholders, boards, and 
management. The best way to do this is to have companies create 
shareholder advisory committees as a fundamental and ongoing 
mechanism to encourage effective engagement. These commit-
tees would act as a communication conduit between a company’s 
general shareholder base and its board and management. 
At the same time, activist investors are posing an ongoing 
threat to corporate governance and the shareholder democracy 
movement. Their tactics have resulted in special interest agree-
ments with the boards of target companies. These agreements 
give the activist access to the inner sanctum of the board in ex-
change for the activist’s ceasing activities that challenge the 
board and incumbent management. The special interest agree-
ments circumvent the traditional corporate governance process 
by preventing other shareholders from participating in the selec-
tion of directors, in turn, silencing the shareholder voices that 
shareholder democracy generally, and SACs specifically, seek to 
augment. To remedy this problem, activist settlement agree-
ments must be presented to the shareholders as a whole for ap-
proval unless the board can show a compelling justification for 
the agreement to be without this approval. Challenging prob-
lems call for creative solutions. The resolution proposed here 
meets that challenge while preserving and advancing share-
holder democracy. 
 
